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This paper attempts to analyze governance systems in Southeast  Asia
and proposes  some policy  suggestions  that  can improve  governance
practices in the region. It also discusses  the links between governance and
official  development assistance (ODA) and the role of the Japan Bank for
International  Cooperation. To put the discussion on governance systems
in a proper context, the paper discusses  the governance and growth nexus
in Southeast  Asia; describes  the operating governance  systems  in Southeast
Asia;  analyzes economic governance, more  specifically  in  the areas of
economic management and growth,  revenue generation, social spending,
access  to services, cost of doing business, and corporate governance; and
examines political  governance, focusing  on the rule  of  law  and judicial
independence,  conflict management, and voice participation.
Regardless of level of development,  Southeast Asian countries need
to  establish  and  strengthen  their  transparency  and  accountability
structures,  both  in  the  public  and  private  sectors,  to  continue  the
momentum  for broad-based growth.  They must also strengthen the fiscal
autonomy  of  their  subnational  units,  and  provide  more  room  for
participation  by civil  society groups.  More  responsive  and  simplified
regulatory  structures  are needed,  and  so are strong  law  enforcement
mechanisms. The rise of ethnic  tensions argues for better peacebuilding
institutions  to narrow  the gap between groups. In  all these, the ultimate
challenge lies in seeking allies and building  constituencies for reform.
To  make  ODA  better  managed  and  more  effective,  donors  must
work  in  partnership  (that  is,  have  a  common  basket)  rather  than
in competition.  Donors  can  also  enhance  the  value  of  aid  by
increasingly  providing  ideas  and  not  just  goods,  untying  aid,
and  allowing  recipient  countries  to  take  "ownership"  and  greater
flexibility  in  the use of aid. Japanese aid  agencies, in  particular,  must
adopt a strategic approach to assisting poverty  reduction  in  the poorer
countries  of Southeast Asia, while  extending their  concessional window
to middle-income  countries. Japan can do well  in proytding  "ideas aid"
based on the Japanese  experience. Japanese  ODA can have higher leverage
if an increasing part of the aid is used for institution  building  and reforms
in  governance.I
Introduction
Until  the Asian financial crisis occurred in mid-1997,  the high-perform-
ing Asian economies  were prized as the new crown jewels of governance.
With public  institutions  believed to be functioning  remarkably well,  good
governance  was seen  as partly responsible  for the region's phenomenal  eco-
nomic strides.  A half decade of turbulence, however, beginning with  the
financial meltdown, followed by a severe recession  in 1.998,  and continuing
with  the sharp slowdown today, has made this view quite untenable. The
governance  gains turned out to be a little  overblown.
Institutional  weaknesses that were overlooked  during  the "miracle"
years surfaced once growth faltered. They were not by themselves  the rea-
son for the crisis. But lack of governmental accountability and transparency,
corruption through cronyism, too much central control, and poor policy co-
ordination at the highest  levels almost surely exacerbated  the crisis and could
pose a major obstacle  to future  growth and stability.
"Social software" failures, one of which was poor administration, were
well  known for years but did  not shake confidence in the economy (Sachs
1999).  The fault lines looked like the classic  symptoms of government  failure:
weak checks  and balances,  excessive  regulations, archaic civil service rules,
policies that handicapped competition, rent-seeking, and poor enforcement
of prudential discipline. Poor advice from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)-Asian  states  applied budgetary brakes and withdrew  liquidity  from
banks that only produced more panic and economic contraction (Yoshitomi
and Ohno 1999)-made  matters worse for weakened domestic institutions,
which were unable to provide guidance  in stimulating domestic  demand in a
coordinated fashion. Authoritarianism, once ignored, was suddenly seen  as
a risk that could slow down  further globalization.  The long pre-crisis  eupho-
ria had pushed the embryo East  Asian model up sharply, such that even after
the recent slide, Southeast  Asian institutions were no stronger (although no
weaker either) than they were a decade  ago.
The crisis left the public  sector with  new governance  pressures. With
increased  debt levels and ballooning budget shortfalls, and the real possibil-
ity  that social spending would  be sacrificed in favor of interest payme~ts,
Southeast  Asian governments  have been forced to practice ~eater ~fficiency
in the use of public resources.  Soaring  contingent  liabilities, the result of moral
hazard (implicit  guarantees)  in the financial system and the infrastructureGovernance in Southeast  Asia: Issues  and
sector, have raised demands for greater transparency  and accountability in
government transactions,  and a clamor for more reasonable  regulatory prac-
tices. Civil society  initiatives in combating corruption have brought about sea
changes, especially in political leadership, in a number of Southeast  Asian
countries (World  Bank 2000).
In short, the economic downturn uncovered dormant afflictions (for ex-
ample, corruption), intensified others (such as poor resource  management),
and provoked new ones (such  as political instability). Overall, such  pressures
have raised the stakes for better public management  throughout the region.
Thus, the path to economic resilience and preventing external shocks from
transforming into major crises  will  need major changes  in public governance
and institutions.
To be sure, it will  not be easy  to fix the vulnerabilities of Southeast  Asia.
Sustaining the reforms would  entail painful  adjustments.  Yet, according to
the Asian Development  Bank (ADB),  several  Asian countries  are already  show-
ing signs of "reform reluctance" or "reform fatigue." If  reform exhaustion
and policy  drift  persist, they will  constitute additional risks to the region's
further advance  (ADB 2001).  Southeast  Asia stands  little chance  of avoiding a
worse fate until it finds some  way to lock up an outcome  that retains many of
the institutional  or governan<:;e  reforms it has staked its future on.
Governance and Institutions
Following  the  definition  set by  the United  Nations  Development
Programme (UNDP) (1998)  and Huther and Shah (1998),  governance  refers
to the exercise  of economic,  political, and administrative power in the man-
agement of the resource endowment of a state. Its practice requires mecha-
ni$ms, processes,  and institutions through which citizens  and groups articu-
late their interests, exercise  legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate
their differences~
Good governance, among others, is:
Transparent.  Free flow  of information is guaranteed;  processes  and insti-
tutions are directly accessible  to those concerned  with them.
Accountable.  Decisionmakers  in government, the private sector and civil
society organizations  are accountable  to the public, as well as to institu-
tional stakeholders.
Based  on the rule of law. Legal frameworks are fair and enforced impar-
tially.
Efficient and effective.  Processes  and institutions produce outcomes that
meet needs while  making the best use of resources.
Participatory. Differing  interests are mediated and broad consensus  is
reached on political, social, and economic priorities (UNDP 1998).
2mtroduction
Governance  includes the state, the private sector, and civil society. All
three are critical to sustainable growth and human development. The state
creates  a favorable political and legal environment. The private sector  gener-
ates  jobs and income. Civil society  expedites political and social interaction.
Governance  also refers to the ability of the state to provide institutions,
defined broadly as the "rules  of the game." Such rules come from formal
laws, informal norms and practices,  and organizational  structures in a coun-
try-specific backdrop. Rules  create  incentives that shape  the actions  of public
officials. They vary because  of differences in social and economic  structures
(World  Bank 2000).
Institutions  are key to governance in the following  ways: they can (a)
channel  information about public goods and in the process  help government
regulate well;  (b) reduce the likelihood  of disputes and help enforce con-
tracts or agreements  through the judicial system; (c) provide clear and trans-
parent mechanisms  governing businesses,  thus reducing corruption and bu-
reaucratic  obstacles;  (d) facilitate competition  through a good regulatory struc-
ture; and (e) ensure, through a system of rewards and penalties, that result-
ing incentives  lead to the desired  behavior (WDR  2002;  Grigorian and Martinez
2000).
This paper examines  governance  mechanisms  and institutions in the con-
text of the following:
Internal rules  and  restraints-constraints on executive  and legislative  power,
independence  of the judiciary, civil service  and budgeting rules, and regu-
latory mechanisms.
Competition-private  participation  in infrastructure, yardstick competi-
tion, and privatization of certain market driven activities; and
"Voice" and partnership-decentralization to empower local governments
and spur civil society  participation.
The paper examines  these concepts  using the three dimensions  of gover-
nance:  economic,  political, and administrative. It follows the distinctions  pro-
posed by UNDP (1998):  economic  governance  includes decisionmaking  pro-
cesses  that affect  a country's economic  activities  and its relationships  with other
economies.  It clearly has major implications for equity.'  poverty, and quality of
life. Political governance  is the process  of decisionmaking  to formulate policy.
Administrative governance  is the system  of policy implementation.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Sections  2 to 4 discuss
Southeast  Asian progress in a global context, the links between  governance
and economic growth  in the region, and the Southeast  Asian governance
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regimes, respectively.  Section 5 deals with  administrative  governance issues:
rightsizing  governments,  civil  service  performance,  and  alternative  service
delivery  modes. Section 6 is economic governance-revenue  raising and spend-
ing  patterns,  access to basic services,  cost of  doing  business and  corporate
governance  (ownership  concentration).  Political  governance  is the theme  of
Section 7, and includes  rule  of law  and judicial  independence,  conflict  man-
agement, and voice  and participation.  Section  8  explores  the  scope  and
extent  of  localization  in  SoutReast Asia,  with  emphasis on fiscal decentrali-
zation.  Section 9 proposes policies  that  can improve  governance practices in
the  region.  A  lengthy  discussion  of  the  links  between  gover~ance  and
official  development  as5istance-and  the role  of the Japan Bank for Interna-
tional  Cooperation-is  found  in the appendix.II
Southeast Asia in a Global Context
Southeast  Asia is a heterogeneous  regional setting comprising a number
of countries with  differing sizes,  levels of development,  and governance  sys-
tems. The Southeast  Asia 5-Singapore,  Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and
the Philippines-are  generally more endowed with  managerial capacity and
systems,  and farther along the route to liberalization. By contrast, the transi-
tion economies  of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, plus Myanmar, still have
much to learn in terms of public management,  and are behind in the path
toward  open and competitive societies.
As a group, these countries are an increasingly important force in the
world  economy. Their collective weight in global economic  activity has been
rising.  Southeast  )Asia is fast growing,  next only to East Asia: the average
annual growth rate of its GNP as a bloc is nearly 6 percent;  that of its GNP per
capita about 4 percent (Figure 1). That is about three times the record of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  countries
between 1990  and 1998.
Many of these nations have embraced  trade liberalization as a means  to
progress.  Some,  like Singapore,  Thailand, and Malaysia, have become  bench-
marks in key areas  with characteristics  of global public goods, including pov-
erty reduction, health care, and education. Southeast  Asian countries invest
selectively in priority  areas such as information technology, biotechnology,
Figure  1.  Southeast  Asia  is  one  of the  fastest  growing  regions  in  the
world.
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and worker training to become  fully networked, knowledge-intensive  econo-
mies (ADB 2001).
Many parts of Southeast  Asia are also being carefully watched, because
of their known weaknesses  in the areas of financial stability,  protection of
environmental commons,  and movement of capital. I~ must be remembered
that  the  1997  Asian financial crisis, which infected  the entire world, began
in Thailand. Its increasing  reliance on exports (at a time when global ;trade  is
contracting  and domestic demand continues  to be stagnant)  makes Southeast
Asia highly vulnerable to a global economic  downturn.!
Most Southeast  Asian nations are part of a broader set of middle-income
countries, which have become important suppliers of global public  goods.
Fallon et al. (2001)  note that middle-income countries are crucial in any col-
lective action to address market failures in the production of such goods as
growth, stability, and good governance, all of which have considerable  po-
tential benefit for the international community. In the specific case  of South-
east  Asia, governance  reform is needed  to recover  the momentum for broad-
based and equitable growth, and to forestall another financial crisis.
Governance and Growth Nexus in  Southeast  Asia
Asia provides ample evidence that there is a remarkable connection  be-
tween administrative guidance and economic  upturn.  Good governance  and
growth go together (Figure 2). When the average growth rate of national
output during the last decade  is charted against  the quality of country gover-
nance, it becomes  apparent that the high-performing economies-Singapore
and Malaysia-have  the edge in public management.  Those  lagging behind,
such as the Philippines and Indonesia, have poor management  structures.
Governance quality  in this case is  a  composite  measure  that  has  the
following  elements:  economic management, income  distribution,  human
development,  absence  of corruption,  bureaucratic efficiency, judicial  effi-
ciency, political stability, and political freedom (Huther and Shah  1998).
As stated above, there is a strong relationship  between good gover-
nance and good development outcomes. The slow progress in regulatory
reform and still restrictive trade regimes in the Philippines and Indonesia,
for example,  have hurt their economic  performance.  In Singapore  and Malay-
sia, good management-improved  tax effort, high priority  given to public
spending in  health and education-has  been central to substantial poverty
reduction. Some  poor governance  aspects  in Indonesia  and the Philippines-
1  Outside of Japan,  Asian exports-which  depends on sales  to the US technology industry-
account  for as  much  as  37 percent  of the regional  GDP. Malaysia,with 80 percent  of its exports  to
the US  consisting  of IT products,  is the  hardest  hit ("Asian Economies:  The East  is in the Red," The
Economist,  May 19,  2001).
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principally corruption and high inflation-inflicted  harm that greatly affected
the poor.
There is also evidence that Southeast  Asian economies  found strength in
some dimensions  of good management  (even  if, in general,  institutional weak-
nesses  easily escaped  notice amid growth).
For instance, were Southeast  Asian governments good at establishing
the rules of the game and playing by those rules? Yes, said investors, who
gave Southeast  Asia fairly high scores  for providing credible rules and con-
sistently enforcing them. In a 1996  World Bank survey of some 3,600  firms
worldwide, fewer than 30 percent  of entrepreneurs  were worried about policy
surprises in Southeast  Asia. As Figure 3 implies, predictability in rulemaking
builds  market confidence that induces fast growth.  Southeast  Asian coun-
tries were quite ahead of even the OECD in this regard. The 1997 World
Development Report survey of businesses  ranked East Asia Pacific (which
includes Southeast  Asia) as among the best-performing regions on measure
after measure (World  Bank  2000).
The situation is unchanged over a longer period. Figure 4 shows that
Southeast  Asia remained convincingly ahead of the other regions (excepting
East Asia) in combining both good governance and high growth between
1990  and 1998.  This suggests  the robustness  of the outcomes  detailed above.
It is true that Southeast  Asia's real institutional strength has been over-
rated. Yet, it is interesting to note that the argument that governance is
handmaid to economic  performance  has never  been  disputed.  This time, how-
ever, it is the underlying institutional weaknesses  of the region, rather than
their depth and power, that have come under intense scrutiny.  In the final
analysis,  and for purposes  of this paper, what is really important is that across
wide  differences over the role played by Asian institutions  stretches the
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Basic sources: Human Development Report 199~  World  Development Report 1997.
Figure  4.  Good  governance  and  growth:  the  picture  remains  the
same  over  a  broader  period.
recognition that governance  does matter. Southeast  Asia's hope of regaining
momentum will  depend, among other things, on (1) salvaging some of the
development management  values they are built on, and (2) expanding the
scope for transparent,  accountable,  and efficient public administration. Gov-
ernance  will be a major consideration  in determining whether Southeast  Asia
has a bright future.
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Governance Systems in Southeast  Asia
The state, within  the context of public management  and governance,  is
defined as a set of institutions that possess  the means of legitimate coercion,
exercised over a defined territory,  referred to as nation or country whose
population comprises  what is called society. That suggests  that in the context
of an organized government,  the state  has a monopoly of rulemaking within
the nation or country (WDR 1997).
This exclusive  possession  of coercion,  when exercised  scrupulously  gives
governments  ample ability to do their steering functions effectively, such as
maintaining macroeconomic  stability and allocating resources  equitably. Yet
it can also lead to arbitrary state action, or create  opportunities for abuse  of
authority by public officials.  Capricious  intervention weakens  the very insti-
tutions that are set up to preserve state power.
The exercise  of restraint is thus as crucial as the exercise  of power in the
effectual functioning of the state. Known as checks  and balances  in political
parlance, mechanisms of restraint are present in  all states and are often
"locked" within  institutions.  Perhaps  the most widely known and most im-
portant of these mechanisms  is separation  of powers.  It is inconceivable  for
any modern state not to have three distinct sets of powers: the legislature
(which makes the law), the executive (which implements the law), and the
judiciary (which interprets the law).  Separation  of powers creates  constancy
and steadiness  in governance.
In the context of public management,  veto points help to regulate offi-
cials' exercise  of power. Veto points ensure that no policies are adopted and
implemented by one party  without  undergoing scrutiny by a third  party.
The wider the separation of powers, the greater  the number of veto  points
to be navigated to reverse any rule-based  commitments.  But veto points can
also be a drag on the successful carrying out of policies; they can make it
difficult  to alter harmful  or outdated rules (WDR 1997).
Southeast  Asian countries in general have many effective checks and
balances  on the actions of political leaders,  as Table  1 shows} To begin with,
the form of state varies-from  the Philippines' presidential democracy  to the
2  The discussion  in this  and  succeeding  paragraphs  is  mainly  culled  from  the 2001 "Country
Profiles"  of The Economist.
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Source  of  basic  data:  The  Economist  Country  Briefings  2001.
parliamentary systems  of Thailand, Singapore,  and Malaysia. Thailand and
Malaysia are constitutional monarchies,  but the latter also has a federal  struc-
ture, which gives it a "vertical"  (intergovernmental) veto point. Thailand's
monarchy has been key to ensuring political continuity in the face of recur-
rent changes  in its civilian government.
In form, Indonesia and the Philippines have powerful chief executives.
The Indonesian presidency  has direct legislative powers, although the presi-
dent is accountable  to the People's  Consultative Assembly,  not directly to the
electorate. But a more assertive legislature  (after the fall  of Suharto) and
demands for more local autonomy (which is intertwined with separatist  vio-
lence) have constrained the powers of the chief executive.  The Philippine
president, directly elected  by voters, possesses  veto powers over laws passed
by the legislature. Yet the system of checks  and balances  in a US-modeled
setup ties down the Philippine  president. Singapore and Malaysia, on the
other hand, have the stronger executives.  Backed up by ruling parties, their
prime ministers dominate the legislature.
That suggests  that the character  of a country's political party also affects
the degree  to which political power is concentrated  or diffused. In Singapore,
10Malaysia,  and Thailand, the sheer  size of the ruling majority in the legislature
(People's  Action Party or PAP, illvfNO, and Thai Rak  Thai, respectively)  and
their prime ministers' dominant and unifying role in the party mean  domina-
tion and little scope  for effective opposition, thus weakening  a veto point. In
Singapore,  PAP has brought to heel  through tough legislation, some non-
governmental  veto points, such as labor unions and professional  groupings,
which now nominally  follow  the party line. But at least political parties in
these  countries are nominally based on ideologies,  unlike those  in the Philip-
pines, where members' constantly shifting allegiances  always favor the in-
cumbent administration.
Some multiparty  coalitions, such as illvfNO,  own large businesses  as a
way of obtaining party funds. This practice fortifies  their hold  on political
power, but raises hard  questions on propriety  and vested interests. Both
PAP and Golkar in Indonesia  have strong links with the military, a veto point
whose role in any civilian  government is often under question because  it
reduces accountability (Kaufmann et al. 1999).  But it is in Indonesia where
the army has had a formal role in governance,  as part of the consultative
assembly. Popular pressure for reform, however, has liberalized somewhat
the Indonesian political structure, in th~ process  downgrading the army and
strengthening the hands of the legislature, which now constantly challenges
the president and her policies.
In  all of the Southeast  Asia 5, judicial  oversight is present, in several
tiers, from local courts handling "first instance" cases  to appeals court and
the Supreme Court. But the effectiveness  of the judiciary  is often compro-
mised by its own weaknesses  and vUlnerability to executive  pressures.
Elections, another veto point, vary in frequency. Short electoral  cycles,
such  as  those in the Philippines, give the voters more opportunities of replac-
ing the legislature  (lower house). But there is a tradeoff: to bolster their
reelection chances,  Philippine  legislators often favor government programs
with  visible  short-term  results, at the expense of sustainable and better
projects.  Ironically, frequent electoral  veto has not stopped the country from
ousting presidents through extra-constitutional means. Lower frequency of
elections,  such  as those in Malaysia and Singapore,  offers more political con-
tinuity  for incumbents.
Indochina and Myanmar are governed quite differently from the South-
east  Asia 5.  Vietnam and Laos are socialist  states  while Myanmar is a mili-
tary regime. All  three have centralized planning structures although Laos is
probably the least  bureaucratized. Cambodia  has opened up a bit  but is still
saddled with  its socialist past. Naturally, veto points come few and far be-
tween. Table 2 summarizes the governance  features of these  states.
ill  Vietnam, government  and the ruling Communist Party overlap exten-
sively:  party committees  exist  at every level of the bureaucracy,  and public man-
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agers  often double as party secretaries  in state  enterprises,  which helps explain
resistance  to reform. A reformist "government bloc" in the party argues for
separation  between  party and government  and greater  role for the private sec-
tor. The rapid growth of the private sector  provides an alternative means of
advancement  for people who are unable to secure  choice  places  in the party.
Economic  liberalization  is slowly eroding the grip of the party.
12In Myanmar,  a military  ruling  jtmta holds sway despite the convincing vic-
tory  of the National  League for  Democracy (led by Atmg  San Suu Kyi)  in  the
1990 multiparty  elections. There is substantial state-controlled  activity  in  most
sectors of the  economy (energy, heavy industry,  rice trade), and the business
environment  is  generally unfriendly.  Poor government  planning  capacity and
political  pressures to open up the political  system exerted by western govern-
ments pose major challenges to the ruling  junta.  According  to the CIA  World
Factbook,  narcotrafficking  and money latmdering are rampant-and are the major
manifestations  of corruption.
Cambodia's  progress  has been thwarted  by  civil  violence  and  political
infighting.  While  the political  conflict  has subsided,  Cambodia's  institutions
of governance are still weak. This issue overshadows  almost all of Cambodia's
development  problems.  The  caliber of public  governance is poor as a conse-
quence of the  destruction  of Cambodia's  educated  elite  in the  1970s and  of
years  of  political  uncertainty.  Fear of renewed  political  instability  and  cor-
ruption  in  government  discourage  foreign  investment  and  slow  reform.
The judiciary  in  Laos, Vietnam,  Cambodia  and  Myanmar  are hardly  in-
dependent  of the executive  branch. In  Vietnam,  people's  courts and  military
tribunals  act as courts  of  first  and  second instance,  and  are hamstrung  by
underdeveloped  jurisprudence.  Elections are nonexistent  in Myanmar;  else-
where  in  Indochina  they  are virtually  under  the  thumb  of the  ruling  parties.
Electoral Participation
In a recent study of governance  in some 85 countries, Kaufmann et al.
(1999),  drawing from a large data set of investor surveys, came up with an
aggregate  index on "voice and accountability," which partly gauges  the ex-
tent of the electorate's  participation in selecting  and replacing  public officials.
Among the concepts  measured by this indicator are change  in government,
orderly transfer, free and fair elections,  free vote, representative  legislature,
and political parties.
The results for Southeast  Asia are illustrated in Figure 5. If the resulting
picture is indicative of how freely the citizens of Southeast  Asian countries
can  choose  their political leaders,  then only the Philippines and Thailand seem
to provide a good environment for free and accountable  elections.  Malaysia
and Singapore, perhaps because  of their autocratic setups, have lower rat-
ings, as does Indonesia, which scores badly. The transition economies of
Southeast  Asia-Vietnam,  Laos, and Cambodia-are,  of course,  still under a
command-and-control governance framework,  appear  to  deprive  their
citizens of  truly  representative  voting. Myanmar seems  an electoral  basket
case.
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Figure  5.  Voice:  Can  Southeast  Asian  citizens  freely  select
and  monitor  thejr  governments?
-~,  '  ,
-.

















Source:  Kaufmann  et al.  (1999).
Veto  Points  Over  a Longer  Period
Instead of just a snapshot in time, a picture of Southeast  Asian gover-
nance  structures within a longer time frame should yield richer insights. That
is what is presented  in Figure 6, which represents  averages  of the years 1945
through 1998.  The data were compiled by Djankov et al. (2001). The indica-
tors include (1) executive  de facto independence,  (2) constraints  on executive
power, and (3) effectiveness  of the legislature.
The first index measures  the degree  of independence  of the country's chief
executive,  that is, whether he or she experiences  substantial autonomy or se-
vere limitations. The index of constraints on executive power measures  the
number of veto points in the country. The veto points include (a) an effective
legislature  (a bicameral  system  gets  more points),  (b) an independent  judiciary,
and (c) a strong federal system.  Effectiveness  of the legislature,  the last index,
determines  how capable  and responsive  the legislature  is.
Legislatures mediate differing interests and debate and establish  poli-
cies, laws and resource priorities  that directly  affect growth and develop-
ment. Electoral bodies and processes  ensure independent and transparent
elections for legislatures. Judiciaries uphold the rule  of law, bringing secu-
rity and predictability to social,  political, and economic  relations  (UNDP 1998).
Figure 6 shows how strongly correlated  the three indicators are, suggest-
ing that the strength of the executive  is always  matched  by the number  of veto
points and the efficacy of the legislature. Note that over a broader period,
Malaysia's  executive  turns out to be the most  powerful. But the veto points are
also quite numerous.  Its 13  states-each with its own constitution,  a council of
state,  a cabinet  and executive  authority and a legislature dealing with matters
14Governance  Systems  in Southeast  Asia -
Figure 6.  An autonomous  executive and veto points  complement each
other.
Source: Djankov et al  (2001)
not  reserved  for  the  federal  parliament-represent  a formidable  set of  con-
straints on the federal  system itself. The Philippines'  presidency comes in  sec-
ond, but again, the veto points,  especially a bicameral Congress and a largely
independent  judiciary,  restrain  its actions. Vietnam  is seen as weaker in  both
executive power  and  institutions  intended  to dilute  it.  But weaknesses some-
times translate into  an advantage: Vietnam is less handicapped  by checks and
balances, which  one finds  in  open political  systems. Its command-based plan-
ning system, as the World  Bank (2000)  suggests, can advance (and control the
pace of) all-embracing reforms, once decisions are taken.
Finally,  it is useful to see how states maintain  a delicate balance between
rights  and  institutions.  Institutions  tend  to  store  up  power  and  authority,
and  in a number  of states, give rise to autocracies. Citizens,  however,  gener-
ally  yearn  for  free and  fair  elections, and  want  competitive  parties  and po-
litical  groupings,  an  opposition  that has an  important  role  and  power,  and
institutions  that have  self-determination  or an extremely  high  degree of au-
tonomy  (Djankov  et al. 2001).
Figure  7 suggests  that  autocracy  and  political  rights  move  in  opposite
directions.  Malaysia  again leads the pack,  not  necessarily because it  is less
autocratic  than  the  rest,  or  that  its  elections  are freer,  but  because in  the
period  under  study  (1972-98), circUmstances in  the two  most democratic  na-
tions in  the  rECtgion,  Philippines  (martial  rule  in the 1970s) and Thailand  (re-
current  coups), did  not  augur  well  for both political  rights  and  open political
institutions.  The current  liberalizing  trend in Indonesia  likewise  is not enough
to  offset  the  long  years  of  autocracy  under  Suharto.  As  expected,  Vietnam
does not fare  well  because of its closed political  system.
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Figure  7.  Autocracy  and  political  freedom  move  in opposite
directions.
Source:  Djankov  et al.  (2001
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Administrative  Governance
Rightsizing  Asian Governments
Southeast Asian  governments  are small  compared  with  OECD  govern-
ments and those of developing  countries  as a whole  (Figure 8). Government
spending in  Southeast Asia,  which  includes  the Philippines,  stood  at 20 per-
cent  of GDP  in  1996, quite  far  below  OECD  central  state expenditure  (34
percent). Admittedly,  the measure of government  size-ratio  of  government
expenditure  to  the  economy's  total  output-is  not  extensive  in scope and
ignores important  off-budget  items (WDR, 1997).  Regardless of the  measure's
weakness,  Figure  8  suggests  that  Asian  economies  have  successfully
made government,  a key  element  of governance,  slimmer.
Consumption-that  part  of government  expenditure  other than  invest-
ment-tells  the  same story  but  the  gaps between  Asia  and  the  industrial
countries  are closer.  Government  consumption  in  East Asia  and  Southeast
Asia had been around  10 percent of GDP, while  that  of the OECD countries
was  17  percent  of  GDP.  Government  consumption  has  a  more  limited
scope-a  large  chunk  is the public  wage  bill-but  is a more  accurate yard-
stick  of what  the  consumers  gain  from  government  spending  (WDR 1997).
Regional  cross-comparisons indicate  that Asian  governments have somewhat
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bridged the consumer  welfare gap between  the region and the highly devel-
oped economies  while  maintaining reduced proportions.
It is easy to see why  Southeast  Asia (to a certain extent) could claim
success  in shrinking governments. Unlike the industrial states,  the region's
governments did  not have to wrestle with  the stubborn difficulties  of the
welfare state,  which has  seen  decades  of uncontrollable expansion  in the  West.
Unlike  the rest of the developing world,  Southeast  Asia (along with  East
Asia) had come a long way from years of post-colonial  nation-building, with
its undue emphasis on expansive state-dominated development strategies
(WDR 1997). It is true that developmental statism still abounds in Asia in
general,  but that by itself could not prevent governments  from shifting from
quantity to quality in providing public goods. As states  take on more mar-
ket-friendly approaches  to public provisioning,  they often pass along more
arduous "rowing"  tasks  to the private sector  and civil society, leaving them-
selves  free to pursue more critical "steering" chores.
But is a lean state the courier of both growth and welfare? While as a
whole Southeast  Asian governments  are small, Figures  9 and 10 show a much
more varied pattern within  the region, and imply that a bit of an expansion
takes  place before governments  settle to a slimmer size, as both incomes  and
human development improve. The order of appearance  of the countries is
not exactly identical, but the following picture should hold:
Hong Kong SAR  and Singapore  were clearly the benchmarks  in size and
scope  of government,  havin~generated the highest growth rates  in per capita
incomes3  and human develo!?ment.  For Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines, government spending was good enough to reach high human devel-
opment but would  need a boost to catch up with the leaders on the income
side. Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were still  struggling to bal-
ance size with  growth and human welfare, and their governments would
probably have to expand a little to provide more public goods.
Still,  as the World  Bank suggests, big governments tend to be quite
inefficient-they  imply costly government  programs-and  consequently  may
add little  to growth. But in the same  breadth, when growth is stalled, social
pressures for  spending rise. Again, inordinate  government consumption
spending, unless the aim is to build  social safety nets during difficult  peri-
ods, is basically a net tax with questionable benefits to society. But cutting
consumption aimlessly may also cut deeply into  items that make people's
lives better, say, teachers'  salaries  or medicine. Rightsizing is not made easier
when a vicious cycle sets  in.
3  Whenever  available, purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  values are used for ratios to facilitate  cross-
country comparisons.  The use of comparable  international  prices noticeably  increases the ratio  for
developing  countries.
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Figure  9.  The  Asian  experience  suggests  that  governments  expand,
then  shrink,  as  income  rises. -
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Performance Management: The Civil  Service
With  relatively  small governments, the fiscal pressure exerted by the
wage bill  is considerably low.  Between 1996  and 2000,  the average annual
central government wage bill  within  East Asia and the Pacific is only 9.4
percent of the GDP, and, as Figure 11 shows, it is even less in Southeast
Asian economies. The  range is  from  an  abnormally low  1.9 percent in
Myanmar to about 7.7 percent in Malaysia, way below the total central gov-
ernment expenditure  for  Southeast Asia,  shown as the rightmost  bar in
Figure 11.
Lean gove~ents  in general  suggest  high administrative capacity,  which
is embodied in the civil service. A good civil service .is necessary  although
not sufficient for good governance.  In East  and Southeast  Asia, civil service
systems  are known as relatively strong, competent, motivated, and profes-
sional.4 But there is a twist  to this.  In an extensive cross-country study,
Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997)  have suggested that although greater respon-
siveness  and openn~ss  can rightfully be asked  of public management  in some
Asian countries, the region's strong civil service systems  are an important
reason  why in much of the region, authoritarianism has co-existed  with  ex-
cellent economic performance.
4  Underneath  this overall picture  of competence are weaknesses. In Cambodia, for instance, techni-
cal and managerial skills are frail, particularly  in the areas  of implementation  planning  and financial
management. Functional responsibilities, formal accountabilities, and integrity struchtres are skimpily
defined  (World  Bank 2000a).
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Figure 12. The global trend  of higher public  employment going  with
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Source:  World  Bank  Public  Sector  and  Employment  Survey.
That does not mean that no downsizing of governments in Southeast
Asia is needed.  Globally, the tendency is to match high wages with  a lean
workforce (WDR 1997).  That is, government employment is negatively asso-
ciated with wages.  A higWy paid, high-quality civil service,  which is small in
number, means substituting  quality  for quantity.  But Southeast  Asia has
defied this trend.
When the government wage to per capita GDP ratio is plotted  against
government  employment, as in Figure 12,  Malaysia and Thailand are seen  as
having a huge number of high-salaried public employees.  The Indochinese
trio  of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia  (and Myanmar), on the other hand,
have slim civil service structures, but the workers are lowly paid toO.5  Only
the Philippines combines  high average  pay with a trim civil service. Overall,
the situation calls for intelligent ways to reduce the number of public em-
ployees.  A cautionary  note is that the right size of the workforce depends on
the roles assigned  to government;  while wage adequacy  depends  on private
compensation  levels (Schiavo-Campo  et al. 1997).
Figure 12 shows average  measures,  which make it necessary  to look at
how the upper layers of the bureaucracies  in Southeast  Asia are faring. The
higher the number of senior civil service personnel  a country has, the better
are the expertise  and skills available and the greater  the ability to implement
5  For  instance,  in Cambodia,  real  wages  in the  public sector  (US$20  / month on average)  hav~  fallen
sharply  in recent  years,  as they  are  outside the  capacity  of national  budget  resources  to pay (World
Bank 2000a).
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policies and development  programs. But the top echelon  must be highly mo-
tivated and salary a key variable for keeping it within the fold and prevent-
ing high turnovers.
Figure 13 shows the variation in  starting pay for senior civil servants,
circa 1995.  Although  on average, the public workforce in the Philippines,
Thailand, and Malaysia is better paid than the rest, their top civil  servants
obtain relatively low salaries.  Singapore,  which is not even the benchmark  in
Asia,  offers the  upper  crust of  its  bureaucracy starting salary levels that
are about twice those in Malaysia, four times those in Thailand, and five
times those in ~e  Philippines.
Such pay differentials are only one reason for dissatisfaction  in higher
ranks. In addition, enforcement  of wage compression  in many countries has
meant greater-than-normal  cuts at higher levels (and/or salary caps),  further
affecting top civil servants. (The Salary Standardization Law in the Philip-
pines is one such pay compression  measure.)  This progressively  leads  to loss
of employees  with options, that is, the more skilled members  of the workforce
(Schiavo-Campo  et al. 1997).
But does high salary go with  high accountability? Or is poor account-
ability,  expressed  as corruption,  more closely associated  with  low wages?
Anecdotal proof suggests  that poor pay compels civil servants  in developing
countries to accept  bribes to augment  their incomes.  Most cross-country  stud-
ies find  only a weak link. So do most anecdotal  researches.
In Indonesia, for instance,  a scrutiny of individual and household data
indicates that the earnings of government workers, on average,  are compa-
rable to what  they might be paid in the private sector. The results of the
relationship between private and public compensation  make low pay as an
explanation for government  corruption doubtful  (Filmer and Lindauer 2001).
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Source: Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997).
Indeed, high pay does not necessarily  lower corruption. As Table 3 demon-
strates,  some Asian countries like South Korea and India already offer their
civil servants  salary levels higher than those  in the manufacturing  sector,  but
that has not deterred corruption in the public sector  in these  nations.
Wei (1998)  estimates that to reduce corruption to the Singapore level
(considered  the benchmark for low corruption levels), public sector  pay will
have to be hiked by a minimum of 60 percent,  as in the case  of Hong Kong,
and by as much as 500 percent,  as in the case  of Sri Lanka. These  increases,
suggests  Wei, are simply "fiscally infeasible."
According to Schiavo-Campo  et at. (1997),  the key measures  needed for
improved civil service performance are rightsizing, incentives,  and account-
ability. Lean size and high-quality  sector  workforce, plus new institutional
rules that guide its behavior, should go together  in creating  a competent  and
honest civil service. Adequate compensation  is necessary  but should~ot  be
viewed as the chief tool for combating  corruption. Decompression  in salary
structure (in Laos, for example,  the compression  ratio has changed from 3:1
in the late 1970s  to 7:1 in the early 1990s)  is also an important  goal. The
overriding goal, taking into consideration  country-specific circumstances,  is
"to achieve a civil service of the size and skill-mix, incentives, professional
ethos, and accountability needed to provide public  goods, help formulate
and enforce the rules, and interyene to remedy market failures."
Alternative  Service Delivery  Modes
As  Southeast  Asian  governments  rightsize,  many  of  the  services  that
they  provide  will  inevitably  have  to be  taken  over  by  other  entities.  Most
countries  in  the  region  have pushed  for some form  of  privatization  in  key
23areas of the economy. Even the infrastructure  sector, which  has proven  to be
impervious  to change, has yielded  to privatization.
In the  recent past,  government  provision  of infrastructure  services was
considered  the  only  way  to  prevent  monopolistic  abuses and  the  whims  of
the market. The energy and telecommunications  subsectors, for example, have
long been considered  "natural  monopolies. II The whole  infrastructure  sector,
because of scale economies and  demand  externalities,  became the  deviation
to  the rule  that  competition  enhances the  quantity  and  quality  of provision.
As a result, private  infrastructure  providers  were  heavily  regulated  for years
(WDR 2002). However,  government  failure  substituted  for  market  failure:
government-provided  infrastructure  were  often  of poor  quality  and insuffi-
cient  coverage.
But times are changing,  at least in some regions such as ;East  and South-
east Asia  and  Latin  America.  As  Figure  14 shows,  private  participation  in
infrastructure  services has been on the rise in  these parts  of the world,  par-
ticularly  in  the 1990s. It  will  be noted,  however,  that  East Asia  (which  in-
cludes  Southeast Asia  in  the  figure),  as a result  of  high  perception  of  risk
after  the  1997 crisis,  has been  losing  ground  to  Latin  America,  which  cap-
tured  the  largest  chunk  of  investment  commitments  with  private  participa-
tion.  Nevertheless,  such IIsheddingll  by national  governments  has raised effi-
ciency and abated the pressure on public  finances (WDR 2002), while  tremen-
dously  improving  the  quality  of infrastructure  in  the region.
Figure  14.  Investment  in infrastructure  with  private  participation:
Asia  loses  ground  after  the  crisis.
Source:  World  Bank  PPI  Project  Database.
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Source:  Human  Development  Report  2001.
One consequence of private  participation  has been to  lower  the  cost of
infrastructure  services, with  spillover  effects on  other services, such as those
in  the  energy sector. Figure  15 shows what  happens when  costs are lowered:
more  foreign  investments  come in  (as they did  in  Singapore, Malaysia,  Thai-
land,  and Vietnam),  inducing  a virtuous  circle where  more  firms  participate
in  various  sectors, principally  in infrastructure.
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Economic Management and Growth
A country needs an enabling environment to achieve stable economic
growth, a goal it is expected  to pursue irrespective of its level of develop-
ment An index that captures  some key observable  aspects  of econolnic gov-
ernance  is presented  in Figure 16.
Huther and Shah  (1998),  who constructed  the composite  measure,  argue
that "the quality of a government's  economic  management  (can)  be assessed
through performance indicators of fiscal policy (debt-GDP  ratio), monetary
policy (central bank independence)  and trade policy (outward orientation)."6
Following their ranking scheme,  a score  between  51 and 75 is good economic
management;  between  41 and 50, fair economic  management;  and between  0
and 40, poor economic  management.  Thus, Malaysia,  Singapore,  and the Phil-
ippines are well managed;  while Thailand and Indonesia  are fairly managed.
Huther and Shah  find a high correlation  between  governance  quality (wherein
economic management  is embedded)  and per capita income, but also sug-
gest that the causality runs both ways, since higher incomes raise the de-
mand for higher-quality management.
In a related study, Grigorian and Martinez (2000)  applied a two-stage
least squares test linking  good governance and industrial performance in
Asian and Latin American countries.  Employing indices of institutional qual-
ity  (government repudiation of contracts, risk of expropriation, corruption,
rule of law, and bureaucratic quality) from a data set assembled  by the IRIS
Center of the University of Maryland, the two find  that institutional quality
turns out to have a very strong positive  impact on the rate of industrial
growth. Their findings also suggest  that the more developed the legal and
regulatory framework, the stricter the enforcement and the lower the ad-
ministrative barriers, the greater  the volume of investments  made available
in the economy and the more efficient the allocation of resources.
6  The economic  management  index is a component  of a broader indicator, quality of governance
(utilized  in  other sections of this paper), which includes citizen participation,  government
orientation, and social  development.  See  Huther and Shah (1998)  for details.
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Revenue  Generation
Since fiscal management is part and parcel of economic governance, it is
important  to focus on a country's  ability  to achieve balance between govern-
ment  spending  and  revenue  generation,  or "between  politically  popular  ex-
penditure  programs and politically  unpopular  taxation."  Good fiscal outcomes
come from  the skill  of governments  to  marshal political  support  for  essential
taxation  and  withstand  pressures  for  the  expansion  of  spending  favoring
certain constituencies  (WDR 2002), who  manage to capture concentrated ben-
efits lIIut pass on the burden  to the public  in  the  form  of diffused  costs.
For starters,  revenue  effort  rises  with  per capita  income,  as Figure  17
indicates.  Yet Figure  18 illustrates  the difficulties  of  Southeast Asian  coun-
tries  in  balancing  tax revenues  and expenditures.  In  all cases, tax revenues
fall  short  of the  amount  needed to  support  government  expenditures.  Ordi-
narily,  this is to be expected, and nations can fall back on domestic and inter-
national  borrowing  to  fill  the gap. But when  the difference  between tax  rev-
enue and expenditure  is upwards  of 3 percent of GDP, the  gap is  not  easily
closed, as in  the case of the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Vietnam,  and Myanmar.
Weak revenue performance  in Camb9dia  (9 percent of GDP in 1998) is largely
due to excessive tax exemptions  and a narrow  tax base  (World  Bank 2000a).
Similarly,  a  small  tax  base  hounds  Myanmar's  recurrent  fiscal
underperformance  (ADB  2000).
How  creditable  are the institutions  of taxation  of Southeast Asian  econo-
mies? These institutions  do  seem to  function  fairly  for  some countries,  like
Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Vietnam  and Indonesia, where  the average tax rev-
enue as a share of GDP is  greater than  16 percent.  Yet there is considerable
room  for  improvement  in  these cases. But when tax  c011ection  is  appreciably
Figure 16.  Economic  management in Asia: not too good,
but not too bad either.
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e: Huther and Shah (2000).
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low,  as in Cambodia, it is clear that the state cannot provide  enough re-
sources for vital  government expenditure.
It matters  a great  deal  also  what kind of taxes  governments  focus  on. Heavy
reliance  on easily  collected  taxes,  such as international  trade taxes,  is a sign of
weak tax management.  Vietnam and the Philippines may score  highly on rev-
enue  collection,  as shown  in Figure 19,  but a large proportion of it is in the form
of customs  duties and other taxes on trade, which are quite distortionary. In
Laos, an adjustment of the exchange  rate applied to the valuation of import
duties accounted  for much of the increase  in tax revenues  (ADB 2001a).  Such
dependence  on customs  taxes  implies a high degree  of protectionism,  as these
taxes  tend to shelter inefficient domestic  producers (WDR  2002).  But changes
are in the horizon. In Cambodia,  for instance,  the government  plans to gradu-
ally reduce  the tariff rate (an average  of 15 percent)  to 0 to 5 percent  in 10  years,
which should spur efforts to develop  alternative  revenue  sources  to offset  such
customs  revenue  losses.  A similar move  is r.appening  in Indonesia,  where greater
domestic  tax effort has actually  resulted  in slight improvement  in domestic  re-
source  mobilization (ADB 2001a).
Maintaining fiscal balance likewise implies achieving discipline on the
expenditure side. Not much progress is being registered in this aspect.  The
Philippines, for one, is still troubled by allocative and operational efficiency
problems-weak  capacity to make expenditure plans in line departments,
and persistence  of line item budgeting. The focus now is on expenditure  bids
being relayed upwards  rather than on resource ceilings being transmitted
downwards. On the bright side, its auditing capacity  remains relatively high.
It has also been shifting to a "performance budget," and has refocused on
programs rather than on line items. However, these changes  in the budget-
ary decisionmaking  process  are more formal than real (JBIC  2001).
Source: Human Development Reporl2000.
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In  Thailand,  public  expendimre  management is confronted  with  a num-
ber  of issues: expendimre  administration  is too  centralized  and  often  dis-
persed  among  different  agencies, frequently  resulting  in  lengthy  delays; the
recurrent  and  capital  budget  process does not  fully  reflect  policy  priorities;
and  mechanisms  for  ex-post  evaluation  are weak  (ADB 2000a). Meanwhile,
in  Laos,  the  prioritization  of  each project  in  a single  year  budget  is  often
decided  by  political  expediency  rather  than objective  analysis,  creating  dis-
tortions  in the resource  allocation  process (JBIC 2001).
Figure 18.  Central government's  budget blues:  can revenue effort
put a brake on spending?
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Social Spending
The Southeast  Asian high-performing economies,  principally Singapore,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (along with East  Asia) became  the toast of
the world because  they shattered the Kuznetsian inverted-U hypothesis:  the
inevitable tradeoff between growth and equity. What the Asian experience
proved was that good economic management  could underwrite growth that
is both market-friendly and equitable.
This was not an easy  thing to do, since it required bold policy stances  in
both the economy and the social arena.  Macroeconomic  policymaking in an
era of globalization was of recent vintage, a whole new field  that entailed
risks as well as opportunities. When the high-performing Asian economies
took chances,  they made themselves  highly exposed  to destabilizing shifts in
capital flows. This later on hit them hard during the Asian crisis, but fueled
phenomenal growth  rates of up to 10 percent yearly throughout  the pre-
crisis period.  But the key was that these governments  put the social funda-
mentals high on their agenda  and made large spending on basic health and
education.
Figure 20 depicts the situation in Southeast  Asia in the 1975-95  pre-crisis
period  and in a later time frame, 1990-98.  In the pre-crisis era, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia made significant headway in both growth and eq-
uity,  proving that appropriately designed expenditure policies in basic edu-
cation and health care could break the stranglehold of poverty in an environ-
ment of heady economic performance.7 Note that the Philippines was left
behind on both counts. When the crisis is factored in, poverty reappears  dra-
matically.  But the pattern is not uniform  between 1990  and 1998. The in-
crease  in poverty in  Indonesia  was  significantly  sharper and more pro-
nounced  (from about 26 percent  in 1996  to 37 percent  in 1999)8  than in Thai-
land. Malaysia's level of poverty incidence  in 1998  was almost  negligible (0.74
percent) (Deolalikar 2001).  Thailand managed to keep the number of poor
people from growing considerably, a commendable  record for an economy
7  To illustrate how fast  poverty was reduced  in the region,  consider  Indonesia.  In the  two decades
leading up to the Asian crisis,  poverty levels fell from over 60  percent  to less  than 12  percent  of the
population (World Bank  2001).  For  Vietnam,  although  not shown  in any chart,  rapid growth in the
1990s  induced a sharp decline  in poverty incidence:  from about 70 percent  in the late 1980s,  the
proportion of the population living  below  the official poverty line declined  to about  58 percent  in
1992/93,  and further to 37 percent  in 1997/98 (ADB 2001b).
8  Suryadahi  et  al. (2000)  note that if the  official figure of11.34  percent  for February  1996  is accepted,
poverty in Indonesia  increased  from the  immediate  pre-crisis  rate of about  7-8  percent  in the  second
half of 1997  to the post-crisis rate of about 18-20  percent  by September  1998  and 18.9  percent  in
February  1999.  Since  then,  Indonesian  poverty seems  to have gone down but is still substantially
higher than  what it was immediately  before  the  crisis.
:>'1Governance in Southeast  Asia: Issues  and  tions
Figure 20.  Poverty reduction:  good governance matters.
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that suffered a great fall. The Philippines, again, did not cope  well. While its
economy  was not badly affected by the crisis, the number of poor Filipinos
rose greatly. The Philippines joined the likes of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambo-
dia in the high-poverty column.
The vulnerability9 of the nonpoor also increased  in the region. Estimates
of household level vulnerability  using cross-sectional  data suggest that the
proportion of the population that is at risk of falling below the poverty line is
considerably  higher than the fraction observed  to be poor. In the Philippines,
some  40 percent of the population was vulnerable in 1997,  compared  with 25
percent that was observed  to be poor (Chaudhuri and Datt 2001).  In Indone-
sia, 45 percent  was found vulnerable in December  1998,  while 22 percent  was
observed to be poor (Chaudhuri et al. 2001).  In Thailand, 35.2 percent was
highly vulnerable in 1999,  while  14.7  was observed to be poor (Bidani and
Richter 2001).
The antipoverty effort plunged because  social spending  in Southeast  Asia
also  nose-dived after the crisis. In the pre-crisis  period, Indonesia  won praises
for being good at allocating resources to protect basic social services and
reduce poverty  during  tight  fiscal periods. Thailand, too, was seen  as rea-
sonably  effective in instilling  fiscal discipline, even if its overcentralized  sys-
tem failed to take advantage of useful information  from national agencies
and lower levels of government (Campos  and Pradhan 1996).
The crisis changed all that. Indonesia and Thailand experienced sharp
budget shortfalls and consequently,  made drastic reductions in government
9  Witilln  the framework of poverty reduction, vulnerability is defined as  the ex-ante  risk that a
household  will, if currently nonpoor,  fall below  the poverty line, or if currently poor, will remain  in
poverty. It is the  likelihood that a household,  regardless  of whether it is poor today,  will be poor
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Figure  21.  In  post-crisis  Asia,  social  spending  takes  a dive.
expenditures  on  social services  (Figure  21). Malaysia  slightly  improved  its
finances but also reduced  its social spending.  The Philippines  managed some-
how  to  keep the  same proportion  of public  spending  on social services.  It
registered  a budget  surplus  in  1998, but  like  the  rest,  contractions  in  the
economy probably  meant that social expenditures  were less in  absolute terms.
Vietnam's  and Myanmar's  budget  deficits after the crisis hit also meant fewer
resources for  social services.
When  spending  on health  and  education  alone  is  taken  into  account,
Malaysia,  Thailand,  and, to a certain extent, the Philippines  seem to do bet-
ter  than the  rest in  providing  for  the needs of their  respective  populations,
as Figure  22 shows~ That means that in these countries,  social safety nets are
in place to cushion the impact  of shocks, and the presence of some social risk
management  instruments  may be  contributing  a lot  to  mitigate  the  worst
features  of povertY.
Several factors have influenced  the amount  of public  spending  on health
and  education  in  Southeast Asia:  distorted  priorities  (high defense spending
in Cambodia,  Laos, and Myanmar  crowd  out the social sector), internal  pres-
sure not to  cut despite  high  budget  deficits (Thailand,  Philippines,  and Indo-
nesia),  safety nets  (policy  and  structural  adjustments  included  funding  for
the  social sector in  Indonesia  and Thailand),  and  dependence on aid  (direct
assistance to  Myanmar  for  social services).
The case of Cambodia  is an illustration  of a country  said to have  "dis-
tortedl/ priorities.  Excessive public  expenditure  on defense from  1994  to 1998
'),'),Governance in Southeast  Asia: Issues  and  tions
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(between 3.3 and 5 percent of GDP annually)  crowded  out the social sectors.
In  1998, public  spending  on health and education accounted for  only 0.7 per-
cent and 1.3 percent of GDP, respectivelylO (World  Bank 2000a). This trend  in
spending  has  not  changed  much  in  the  following  years. To  make  matters
worse,  actual expenditure  for education-and  even more so for health-falls
short  of budgeted  levels.
Myanmar's  military  spending  is also high.  In  1997, for  instance, public
expenditure  on defense accounted  for  7.6 percent of  GNP  (WDR 2001). On
the  other hand,  past spending  on health  and  education  had  averaged  about
0.5 percent of GDP. Myanmar's  budget  deficit  has strained  social sector pro-
visions,  resulting  in  low  educational  attainments  and inadequate  healthcare.
Like  Indonesia,  Myanmar  has to  rely  on  donor  assistance (particularly  from
the European  Union)  to  support  basic social service  provision  (ADB 2001b).
Laos'  public  expenditure  for  defense is  similarly  high  at about  3.4 per-
cent of GNP  in  1997 (World  Bank undated2).  .
In  Indonesia,  the  government  tried  to  maintain  the  same real  level  of
spending  for basic education  as in pre-crisis  years through  a "stay in  school"
I°Public  spending on health  of Cambodia  is among the  lowest  in the  world (World Bank  undated).
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campaign  in 1998, which  includes  targeted  scholarships  for the  poorest chil-
dren;  block  grants  to schools to compensate for  reduction  in  parental  contri-
butions  and  increases in costs of inputs.  Some donors  also sought to  protect
the social sectors through  adjustment loans. The Indonesian  government  used
part  of  the  Policy  Reform  Support  Loan  from  the  World  Bank  in  1998 to
support  the  purchase  of food  and  essential  drugs,  including  vaccines  and
drugs  needed  for  communicable  diseases control  (World  Bank undated2).
Due to a big revenue  shortfall  in  1998, following  the Asian  financial  cri-
sis, the  Philippine  government  imposed  austerity  measures, cutting  alloca-
tions  by  as much  as 25 percent.  But  mindful  of possible  adverse effects,  it
exempted the basic social services sector (basic education and primary  health).
Despite  this favorable  policy,  the  social sector failed  to  maintain  its share in
the  national  budget  (Manasan  2001). Trends  in  education  financing  in  the
Philippines  are likewise  not encouraging.  With  rapid  expansion  of  publicly
funded  state colleges and universities,  tertiary  education is crowding  out the
budget  for  elementary  education  (World  Bank 1999a).  In  a similar  vein, Viet-
nam has protected  social sector spending  even if the overall budget has fallen
(World  Bank 2000b).
Malaysia's  relatively  strong fiscal and debt management policies allowed
it  to  weather  the  early  effects of the  financial  crisis,  slowing  down  contrac-
tion.  Malaysia  has run  budgetary  surpluses  for the past five  years, sheltering
social  sector expenditures.  The impetus  for  this  is reliance  on a regulatory
regime  that  expands  private  provision  of  social services  (World  Bank  un-
dated 1).
Among  the  Southeast Asian  countries,  Thailand  has been spending  the
highest  in  public  health,  roughly  about  6 percent  of GDP compared  to  less
than 3 percent  for Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and Malaysia.  To preserve  the
gains in  health  status, the  Thai  government  increased the budget  for  health
welfare  by 10 percent in 1998, although  it still represented a fall in  real health
expenditures.  There were  budget  cuts in  other areas, such as the program  on
AIDS  (World  Bank undated2). In the education sector, the financial  crisis had
induced  a slowdown  in the external training  of leading science and engineer-
ing  educators,  considered  key  to  quality  imprqvement  (World  Bank  un-
dated1).  Donor  assistance (e.g., ADB  student  loan  fund)  has also helped  the
Thai  government  step up  social spending.
Access to Services
Government  policies  that combine public  spending and private  participa-
tion  in  cost-effective  ways  in  infrastructure  services have not  only  increased
tremendously  the  flow  of  investments  in  this  sector, they have also ensured
greater coverage of poor people within  the Southeast Asian region. The quality
and coverage of infrastructure  services such as electricity, water, telecommuni-
cations and transport have a major impact  on living  standards (WDR 2002).
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But the record is mixed, on a rundown by country. The governments  of
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines have apparently spent
well for water and sanitation services,  which remain as government spend-
ing items. As Figure 23 shows, some 80 percent or more of the population,
including the poor, had access  to improved water source and sanitation fa-
cilities in the 1990s.  Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,  Myanmar, and even Indone-
sia have not done as well during the same  period.
In enlarging access  to electricity, the region's governments  have a much
better record, with Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,  and Singapore  leading ~e
way (Figure 24). Surprisingly, Myanmar has an edge over the Philippines.
The broad  approach that has been successfully adopted by the region's
pacesetters  is to combine participation by the private sector,  incorporation Elf
coverage  targets,  and effective regulation that cuts costs,  making the services
more affordable (WDR 2002).
The Philippines did  the reverse by heavily regulating power distribu-
tion in the country and maintaining its monopoly over power generation. It
also failed to encourage  investments  in the area,  precipitating a power crisis
in the late 1980s,  when infrastructure  deteriorated rapidly.  Power genera-
tion was subsequently  restored to its previous level, but at considerably  high
costs  and with grave distributional and welfare effects. Much of the effort to
lift  anticompetitive regulations will  have to come from the enforcement  of a
new power reform law.
The presence  of public and private providers is seen  to add to high insti-
tutional  quality.  In Malaysia, a reliable system of public clinics has main-
tained pressure  on the private sector  to keep  prices reasonable  (van de Walle
Sources:  World  Development  Repo112001;  Human  Development  Repo112001.
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and Need  1995; World  Bank  1992). But  such competition  is possible  only  in
areas that  are  heavily  populated  enough  to  sustain  multiple  providers.  In
remote  areas largely  inhabited  by the poor,  provision  still  rests with  govern-
ment  (WDR 2002).
Data  on what  causes the differences  in access  and level  ef infrastructure
services  in  Southeast Asia  are hard  to  come by,  but  a few  anecdotal  facts
might  be useful.  Lack  of c!-ear-cut rules  on how  to mobilize  private  invest-
ment  is  apparent  in  Vietnam  (World  Bank  200!il9) and  Laos  (W0rld  Bank
19~9). Institutions  in Laos are relatively  weak,  given  its low  level of develop-
ment.  On  the  other hand,  Camb0dia  suffers  much  from  inadequate  capacity
to  plan,  manage  and  implement  water  services.  In fact,  there  is no institu-
tional  structure  that can do it,  resulting  in unrelial9le service and poor  quality
of water  (Asian Development  Outlook 2000). It also has no  framework  for pub-
lic-private  participation  in  electricity  supply  (World  Bank 2000a)..
Even  if  rules  exist  in Indonesia,  the  private  sector remains  hesitant  to
participate,  while  the public  sector is  inefficient  in  maintaining  water  supply
and  sanitation,  roads  and  urban  services  (ADB  2001b). In  the Philippines,
nonurban  electricity  is provided  by rural  electric cooperatives, most of which
render  unsatisfactory  services. Partly  as a result,  electrification  in  rural  areas
is less than  65 percent.  Philippine  tariffs  are also  among the  highest  in the
region  and  have discouraged  foreign  investment  (World  Bank 1999a).
Cost  of  Doing  Business
Despite decades  of progress,  Southeast  Asian economies  are still hedged
in by regulations that waste resources  and stymie competition. To be sure,
37Figure  25.  Are  market-friendly  regulation  existent  in  Southeast  Asia?
Source:  Kaufmann  et al.  (1999).
government interventions can lessen  market failures, but governments may
also inflict harm by imposing regulations to compensate  for market failures.
Government  failure occurs  when administrative capacities  are weak, in which
case  the tendency  is to overregulate activities (WDR 2002).
Excessive  regulations  undermine trade and business  development.  Wage
and price controls, anti-competition policies, barriers to en~  in  major eco-
nomic sectors,  and weak antitrust policies combine in diverse ways to dis-
courage the flow  of investments,  thus hindering growth.
When all these  factors are measured,  the result is a composite  index of
regulatory burden (Kaufmann et al. 1999). For Southeast  Asian nations, the
regulatory picture is varied (Figure  25). Singapore  stands out as the economy
with the friendliest regulatory structure. The Philippines, Malaysia,  and Thai-
land to lesser  degrees  have likewise relaxed many of their stringent market-
unfriendly policies.  As expected,  the command  economies  in the region, chiefly
Laos and Vietnam, are still weighed down by a host of regulations.
When it comes to regulations for business entry, the cost of business
registration  as a fraction  of GDP per capita varies widely  in  Southeast
Asia. The cost of obtaining  legal status to operate a business enterprise
includes costs of procedures, legal and notary charges,  and the monetized
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value  of the entrepreneur's  time  (Djankov  et al. 2001). In Thailand  and
Singapore, registration costs are comparable to those in OECD countries,
elsewhere in the region they are more expensive (Figure 26). Vietnam has
the  highest business entry  costs; Indonesia  is not  tar behind.  Stricter
regulations,  such as those found  in Vietnam,  are thus  associated with
higher costs.
The number of procedures  required to register  a business  is also higher
in Southeast  Asia compared  to industrial countries.  In Canada  and Australia,
for instance, it takes only two steps to complete the registration.
The number of  procedures  correlates  with income  per capita,  as  Figure 27
shows.  Lower income  economies  such  as  Vietnam,  the Philippines,  and Indone-
sia have more procedures.  The number of procedures  is also associated  with
time and cost  variables,  implying that entrepreneurs  pay a steep  price in terms
of fees  and delays  in countries  that make  intense  use of ex-ante  screening.  As an
example,  in Vietnam,  completing  16  procedures  demands  112  business  days  and
1.78  percent  of GDP per capita (Claessens  et al. 1999).
Claessens  et al. (1999)  argue that while  stricter regulation of entry is
associated  with higher quality of products, better pollution records,  or keener
competition (as suggested by data in a cross-section  of countries), stricter
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Source:  Djankov  et al.  (2001).
regulation of entry also brings about sharply higher levels of corruption, and
a greater unofficial economy.
In public choice  theory,  more procedures  and longer  delays  spawn  bribery
and/ or make entry  less  appealing  to potential  competitors  (Djankov  et al. 2001).
Regulation  becomes  an instrument to create  rents for bureaucrats  and/ or in-
cumbent  firms. Stricter  regulation should then be associated  with greater  cor-
ruption and less  competition  (Claessens  et al. 1999).  In Vietnam,  the Philippines,
and Indonesia,  overregulation  of entry produces  more corruption  revenues  (Fig-
ure 28).
Figure 29 shows that the high costs of regulation also give rise to a
larger unofficial economy. This is true in Indonesia, and to a lesser  extent,
the Philippines and Malaysia. Costly regulations deter entry into the formal
sector and reduce competition.
A turnaround  in the regulatory systems in Southeast  Asia would  re-
quire simpler procedures and more responsive regulatory institutions.
Corporate Governance
Policies and rules adopted by governments  guide the behavior of firms,
which, in turn/ may influence the economic  policies of governments.  In East
and Southeast  Asia, companies  tend to have a concentrated  ownership struc-
ture/ which can be both beneficial and greatly harmful to efforts at account-
able governance.  This section  briefly examines  the links between ownership
concentration and the strength of legal institutions across  Southeast  Asia.
The World  Bank suggests that concentrated ownership is a substitute
for weak legal protection. Information  asymmetry associated  with  concen-
trated ownership favors investors: control of information ensures  that their
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Source: Djankov et al. (2000).
4.1resources  are in their interests. Because  of this control, a small number of
owners can stop the diversion of corporate  resources  without having to deal
with courts. A recent  study showed that investors  favored Asian firms whose
controlling shareholders  had larger equity stakes.  Concentrated ownership
seemed  to provide the assurance  that investor rights over the allocation of
resources  and returns would  be protected (WDR 2002).
But ownership concentration  can also put a country's legal institutions in
harm's way.  Numbers are important: for instance,  the largest ten families in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand control half of the corporate sector
in terms of market capitalization. In Indonesia,  a single family (the Suhartos)
has ultimate control over 16.6  percent of the total market capitaliz;ltion.  The
same  is true in the Philippines, where the Ayalas control 17.1 percent of the
same (Claessens  et al. 1999).
In empirical tests,  using assorted  measures  of ownership concentration,
Claessens  et al. (1999)  find  that a relatively small number of families have a
strong influence on the ~conomic  policy of governments.  Anecdotal evidence
confirms the undue influence. The Suharto family in Indonesia, which has
close  links to some  417  listed and unlisted companies,  has obtained preferen-
tial treatment  from government; many family members  (besides  Suharto him-
self) had served in some government functions. One quarter of the value of
these  firms was directly attributable to their political connections  (WDR  2002).
Indirect control of companies  by ruling political coalitions-suCh as  the UMNO
in Malaysia-is  another  mode by which business  receives  policy favors from
government.
Such wealth concentration and the interlocking links between owners
and government officials cast doubts on the independence of legal institu-
tions in Southeast  Asia. According to Claessens,  Djankov and Lang, they
raise the prospects  that the legal systems  in some  parts of the region may be
endogenous  to the variety and strength of control over the corporate sector.
In a situation  of "state capture,"  legal institutions  are subverted and less
likely to promote transparent and market-based  activities.
In Figure 30, the share of the largest  15 families in total market capitali-
zation, on the one hand, and the efficiency of the judicial system,  the rule of
law, and corruption, on the other hand, are very strongly correlated. This
indicates that ownership concentration  in East  and Southeast  Asia determines
the level of institutional  development of the legal system.
The higher the share of the top 15 families and the lower the level of
efficiency of the judiciary, the weaker the rule of law and/or  the higher the
judicial corruption. Thailand, Indonesia11  and the Philippines seem to have
the lowest level of legal institutional  growth because  of heavy ownership
concentration in the corporate sector.
42Economic Governance
11  mdonesia,  surveys  suggest,  ranks  hi~  among  countries  with the worst corporate  governance  in
East  Asia. m the  words of  the  World B~  "There  is a lack  of  transparency  and  financial disclosure,
accounting  and auditing systems  are weak,  rights of minority investors  are insufficient,  and inter-
locking ownership  between  banks  and corporations  have  contributed  to the  collapse  of  the  bank  and
corporate sector  during the crisis. Lack of transparency  and weak regulatory frameworks  also




Rule  of  Law  and  Judicial  Independence
Prior to the Asian crisis, there was a positive  perception  of rule of law in
the region.  Data  from  the  University  of Maryland's  IRIS Center suggest that
as the  East and  Southeast Asian  countries  experienced  tremendous  growth,
confidence in  their  legal institutions  also rose (Figure 31). From 1990 to 1997,
there was an upward  trend  in the perceived strengthening  of the rule  of law.
Yet even as the  high-performing  Southeast Asian  economies registered
record-breaking  growth  rates,  signs  of  weak  points  within  the  region  had
emerged:  judicial  independence  was  grossly  compromised  and  corruption
rose to  unprecedented  levels.  Corruption  and  a weak  judicial  system  are
likely  partners in crime, so to speak, feeding  on each other to erode a country's
institutional  defenses (Mauro  1997).
Table 4, drawn  from  the 1998 World Competitiveness  Report,  suggests that
as a whole  Asia is not rated  highly  on both counts, although  it is the ASEAN
trio  of Indonesia, Malaysia,  and the Philippines,  plus China, which have pulled
down  the  overall  ranking  of Asia.  Indonesia  and the Philippines  are among
the  bottom  dwellers  worldwide,  indicating  that in these countries,  economic
Source:  University  of  Maryland  IRIS  Center.
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rent-seekers  are perceived  as often having a heyday undermining the institu-
tions designed to keep them out.
When a country's institutional defenses  are relatively weak, such  as  when
the judiciary fails to keep its place as a central pillar  of the rule of law, or
when regulatory agencies  become the nesting place for  corrupt practices,
there are telling effects  on economic  governance.  Unreliable institutions force
entrepreneurs to either "hit  and run,"  that is, invest in risky,  speculative
activities that offer high returns but allow them instant exit once they sense
trouble;  or "play  it safe," that is, invest in lo:ng-term projects with  lower
returns but require less capital outlay. In the pre-crisis period, most of the
Southeast  Asian economies  had plenty of both, with  most short-term capital
inflows  directed at superfluous purposes (such as real estate which gener-
ated asset  bubbles) and long-term inflows  generally going to trade and ser-
vices. Corruption is also linked to lower spending on health and education,
which in turn narrows opportunities for poor people to invest in their human
capital.
Thailand had been cited for its judicial autonomy and lower corruption
levels.  Clearly, it was the exception  in Southeast  Asia rather than the rule, as
shown in Table  4. Yet, ironically, it took the center  stage for excessive  invest-
ments in less important sectors,  and was the first Asian country to suffer a
sharp reversal of fortune. Other governance  factors were at work.
Vietnam's legal framework  still causes  problems in key areas such as
property rights and the development  of "due process  of law." Competition is
hamstrung by the lack of an independent  judiciary,  certain uncertainties in
property law that limit  the evolution of financial markets, and the inherent
bias of the system in  favor of the state sector (and collective ownership).
Policy changes  to reverse the former command system may be enough to
initiate the transition. But without an appropriate legal framework, they will
be insufficient  to facilitate  long-term  development  (Thuyet 1995). Woo-
Source:  World  Competitiveness  Reporl1998
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Cummings  (2001) argues, however,  that in  countries  with  strong state tradi-
tions,  states can "create"  the rule  of  law  and  coerce better  governance.  She
cites the  case of Malaysia,  where  the state, through  executive  fiat,  compro-
mised  the  power  of the judiciary  by  redirecting  it toward  its  own  "develop-
mental"  ends.
The  "killing  fields"  in  Cambodia  in  the  1970s also all  but  extinguished
the country's  judicial  institutions.  Naturally,  the present legal and  regulatory
structure  is  weak and  invariably  incomplete,  incapable  of being  enforced  or
lacking  in  internal  coherence, thus contributing  to  overall  uncertainty  (World
Bank 2000a). In Indonesia,  Sissyphean efforts  to  bring  to justice  past corrup-
tion  cases, mainly  involving  the  rich  who  raked  in  illegal  gains  during  the
Suharto regime, have been in  part responsible for  its consistent low  scores in
surveys  on rule  of  law,  corruption  and business  environment  (ADB  2001b;
World  Bank 2001).
High  levels  of public  corruption  undermine  the  legitimacy  of the state
itself  and  weaken  its  capacity  to  provide  institutions  that  support  growth
and development.  Corruption  reflects a distorted  policy  environment,  where
public  officials  are likely  to manipulate  rules  to pursue  their  self-interest.  It
weakens the judiciary  so much  that it is unable to provide  a credible  threat of
punishment  when  official  misconduct  is discovered  (WDR  1997).
Conflict  Management
Growth and poverty outcomes  in Asia (as well as in other regions)  since
the mid-1970s  have banked on the quality of institutions for conflict manage-
ment, a recent study revealed.  In divided societies,  such as those with ethnic
fragmentation, low-quality institutions for managing conflict-including  gov-
ernment institutions  and inadequate social safety nets-magnify  external
shocks,  inducing distributional conflicts and delaying policy responses.  Shift-
ing social balances  are in turn affected by a government's institutional  re-
form efforts (WDR 2002).
Ethnic tensions  have been rising in Southeast  Asia in the last decade,  as
Figure 32 shows. This trend implies poor conflict management  on the part of
these countries, and argues for better public  institutions to bridge the gap
between groups.
Economic growth in countries whose current levels of ethnic tension  are
highest (Indonesia and the Philippines) is in a precarious state. Figure 33
indicates that a high degree of ethnic hostilities can affect the rate of~owth.
The concern  is that these  economies  will  go into a steeper  tailspin if interna-
tional investors equate ethnic conflict with  political  instability and pullout
from the region.
When conflict is prolonged, access  to social services  and economic  op-
portunities is severely  curtailed. In Cambodia,  for instance,  some parts of the
country are still inaccessible  even as the security situation has  eased.  Govern-
47Figure  32.  Ethnic  tensions  are  on the  rise  in  Southeast  Asia.
Source:  University of Maryland IRIS  Center.
ment is unable to provide  health and education services, or basic physical
infrastructure. This, as a consequence,  has exacerbated  poverty and retarded
growth (World  Bank 2000a).
As a result, conflict intensifies the difficulty to establish  institutions that
benefit broad segments  of society.  To begin with, ethnic groups tend to have
lower  living  standards than the majority.  In Vietnam,  for instance, these
groups live in less productive areas  characterized  by difficult  terrain, poor
infrastructure, limited access  to off-farm work and the market economy,  and
inferior access  to education. Large differences  in returns to productive char-
acteristics also explain ethnic inequality (van de Walle and Gunewardena
2000).  Institutions that benefit the poor are thus needed  to ensure  successful
conflict management.
Voice  and  Participation
In  theory,  a strong  civil  society comes in  handy  as a companion  to con-
tinued  growth  and  development.  Broader  participation  energizes  people,
bringing  social  capital  into  play  in  economic  development,  and  makes the
government  more  responsive  to people's  needs.
A  strong  civil  society  has  noteworthy  governance  features  as well:  it
wins  legitimacy  for  macroeconomic  decisions  from  society  more  broadly,
increases the number  of veto points  that can counter  inconsistent state action
(WDR 1997), and brings  public  pressure to bear on the quality  of government
service. Some ineffective  institutions  may  exist in  part  because there are no
civil  society groups  pressing  for  change.
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In practice, participation is distributed as unequally as income and hu-
man development.  Indeed, as Figure 34 indicates, civil  society gains were
prominent in Asian countries with  slow economic  pickup. In the Philippines,
for example, nongovernment organizationsl2  registered a powerful presence
as a voice mechanism,  even in the absence  of high growth. Voice and growth
were thus not positively correlated.
Some caveat  is in order. Institutional barriers facing civil  society might
be of a different nature altogether, compared with  institutional obstacles  to
growth,  such as regulatory excesses.  Examples of these  barriers are the ab-
sence of freedom of expression  (as exemplified by authoritarian states like
Indonesia and Malaysia) or of a functioning feedback mechanism (even in
countries where voice is strong, such as the Philippines, the government is
not quite well equipped to listen). Then there is the problem of collective
action: the cost of organizing coalitions can  be quite frustratingly high. These
factors should explain in part why the connection  between  voice and growth
is not well established  at the ground level.
Hirschman's  exit/voice  pairing  (with "exit"  referring to the ability  of
the public to choose  from alternative suppliers of public service  when dissat-
isfied with  government providers) may also turn up to be a good source for
12  The Fifth Asian Development  Forum gave  two estimates  of the number of NGOs  in the Philip-
pines,  circa 1993:  2,000,  according to CODE-NGO  (a national coalition of development-oriented
NGOs)  and 18,000,  a NEDA estimate.  This paper  used the more conservative  figure of 2,000.
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Figure  34.  Voice  and  growth  in several  Asian  countries  move  in
opposite  directions.
Basic sources: Fifth Asian Development Forum 1996; Human Development Report 1996.
explaining the poor correlation. Paul (1991)  suggests that the use of voice
would  improve  accountability most when public service operates  as a mo-
nopoly and when incomes are low. In this case,  the intervention of agents
outside  of the community  (that is, NGOs) would  be the antidote to slow
growth. On the other hand, when public service can be differentiated and
there are fewer constraints  on income, the use of exit is preferred and serves
as the stimulus for growth. Public pressure is less needed when people can
turn to other providers.
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Decentralized Governance
Decentralization means shifting a substantial block of political,  fiscal,
and administrative powers held by central governments  to subnational  pub-
lic authorities. It assumes  that subnational governments,  once autonomous,
are capable  of taking binding decisions  in at least  some policy areas.  In more
practical terms, decentralization expands the resources  and responsibilities
of existing subnational government  units (WDR 1999/2000).
It is widely  held that decentralization improves the quality of gover-
nance. A government that is closer to its people works best, since it has a
better feel of the concerns  of local constituents.  In turn, citizens  and commu-
nity groups can better participate in the affairs of government  under a decen-
tralized system. Proximity serves  to enhance  preference  matching for public
services. Moving the decisionmaking closer to people who are affected by
those decisions  lowers both information and transaction  costs.  Conversely,  a
centralized approach to management  of the economy stymies development
at the local level. Thus, a decentralized  form of governance  is as much valid
in less  developed  public sector  environments  (such  as  those in Southeast  Asia)
as in advanced,  highly industrialized settings (Huther and Shah  1998).
Southeast  Asian countries carry out decentralization in various ways.
Deconcentration  is the path of least  resistance.  Here, central governments  grant
autonomy  to their own branch or district offices  without altering  the hierarchi-
cal relationship  between  field and central  offices.  An example  is the Philippines'
Department  of Health, which is now undergoing  a painful transition  to a more
regionalized  structure. Privatization  in varying degrees  is taking place in Indo-
nesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand, and the Philippines  as part of a "shedding" of func-
tions of overly burdened  central  governmentS.  Often the targets  of privatization
are state-owned  enterprises.  Localization,  on the other hand, altogether  shifts
authority, responsibility, and accountability  to subnational/local governments
elected  by constituents.  A form of this, devolution,  has  taken  place  it<  the Philip-
pines with the transfer  of public service  provisioning in health and to a lesser
degree, social welfare and agricultural extension,  to local governments.  An-
other type, delegation,  in a real sense,  is not decentralization,  since subnational
governments  are merely asked  to act on behalf of the higher  levels. Decentrali-
zation  implies that local governments  should be principals acting  on their own
rather than agents  of the central government.
51Governance in Southeast  Asia: Issues  and  tions
Extent of Localization in Southeast  Asia:  The Broad Canvas
The extent of subnational responsibility differs everywhere because  of
varying country-specific circumstances.  If subnational expenditure as a pro-
portion  of GDP represents the size of subnational governments (which in
turn measures  the degree  to which local tiers are responsible  for public ser-
vice provision), Southeast  Asian subnational units (for which data are avail-
able) are in the lower rungs. In Figure 35, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Thailand are shown to be the least decentralized. Malaysia has a bit more
elbow room for local-level provisioning.
Elsewhere in Asia, it is Mongolia, China, and India where subnational
governments are bigger, at abo}lt 20 to 22 percent of GDP. These  compare
favorably with those of Latin American countries like Brazil, Argentina, ahd
Bolivia, considered frontrunners in the decentralization  race in the develop-
ing world  (WDR 1997).
Another way of looking at rough orders of magnitude of subnational
governments  is to check out the size of their bureaucracies  (Figure 36)}3  The
command economies of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have huge
subnational government  workforces, far exceeding  their own central bureau-
cracies.  In Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the number of public em-
ployees at lower tiers is smaller than that in the central governments. In
these  three countries, size measured  by the number of employees  correlates
with size measured as expenditure per GDP. This is to be expected,  since a
huge chunk of public expenditure goes  to payment of wages.  Singapore  has
no subnational bureaucracy-because of its smallness,  it has no need for it.
No data are available for Myanmar.
Size,  however, is not necessarily  correlated with either extent of author-
ity or degree of independence  from the central government.  Shah (1994)  ar-
gues that many Asian governments  were formed from unitary constitutions,
and  thus,  for  a time,  followed  a  path  of  centralized  planning  and
decisionmaking,  regulation  and provisioning of public services  (on  the grounds
of promoting  national unity and uniformity,  and preserving internal mar-
kets). Singapore,  China, Indonesia,  Korea, and the Philippines are examples
of unitary Asian countries, where effective control of government still rests
with the central authorities (regardless  of size of subnational  governments).
A federal form, however, does not mean loose control of central govern-
ments. Malaysia and India are federal states  whose central government  wields
considerable power over subnational units. The style of governance  that is
common in many Southeast  Asian nations, because  it concentrated  power in
central governments, nurtured  authoritarian regimes.
13  The count  for both  central  and subnational  personnel,  as  a proportion of  the population,  excludes
health,  education,  and police  personnel.
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Paradoxically,  however,  subnational  governments in neighboring  China-
widely  held  to be highly  centralized-may  have more  authority.  During  the
1980s, local  governments  secured a significant  degree of autonomy  from  the
central  government.  Today,  China  retains  the  unitary  structure  of govern-
ment but is classified as a "decentralized  federation"  (Shah 1994). In the Phil-
ippines,  too,  decentralization  has occurred  because of the passage of a local
autonomy  act in  1991, which  led  to the  devolution  of basic services (health,
social welfare,  agriculture,  public  works)  to  local jurisdictions.  Political  pres-
sures  for  subnational  autonomy,  as well  as separatist  demands,  have  also
forced  the  Indonesian  central  government  to  hand  over  more  authority  to
local units.  To  a certain  extent,  decentralization  in  Southeast Asia  is also a
response to failures  of some national  governments  (e.g., the  Philippines)  to
ac)tieve broad-based  growth  and  development.
Structure and Forms of Multilevel  Governments in Southeast  Asia
Except for Singapore, Southeast  Asian countries have adopted multit-
iered systems  with  one or two elected subnational governments. Although
most have unitary backgrounds, owing to -the greater premium on unifor-
mity and equal access  to public services,  many of !hem have tried to recast
their structures to promote decentralized  decisiornriaking.  Some  kind  of fed-
eralism is evolving, which is more open to greater freedom  of choice,  politi-
cal participation, innovation, and accountability (Shah  1994).
This multilayering  is not just an idiosyncrasy: each tier of subnational
government is expected  to provide only those services  that benefit residents
of the jurisdiction.  Such "fiscal federalism"  assigns a significant  role to
subnational governments  in  allocating resources.  When the benefits of par-
ticular services have no substantial spillovers to residents of neighboring
jurisdictions, the appropriate  levels and mix of serVices  can complement  local
preferences.  If  local consumers are dissatisfied with  the service provision,
they can express  their displeasure  by voting incumbents  out or by moving to
other jurisdictions. In this respect,  local politics can approximate  the efficien-
cies of a market in the allocation of local public services  (WDR, 1999/2000).
But there is a caveat:  in many Southeast  Asian countries with autocratic set-
ups or where land and labor markets  are constricted,  people may not partici-
pate meaningfully in the political process  or "vote with their feet." Such  rep-
resentation may be further constrained by poor capacity to manage multi-
level governments.
Table 5 provides a rough portrait of the depth of subnational  represen-
tation in  Southeast  Asia. The number of subnational  tiers of government es-
tablished suggests how responsive the setup is to local needs and prefer-
ences.  Needless  to say,  the number of layers al&o  says much about  a country's.
political make-up and constitution. Malaysia, a federation with a population
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of 21.8  million, has two tiers and about 156  subnational  bodies.  That is about
seven  local bodies per million population.  Malaysia  is divided into 13  states,
and under the state governments  are city, municipal, and district councils.
That may seem  a large set of jurisdictions, but it is leaner when compared
with say, India, which has 240  bodies per million population}4
In full-fledged  decentralized countries, such as those belonging to the
OECD,  the number of subnational  tiers and jurisdictions is considerably  less}5
By contrast, Thailand and the Philippines have more numerous, and there-
fore, deeper and smaller, subdivisions. Both have almost the same number
of intermediate governments:  the Philippines has 76 provincial governments
14  India,  with  a population  of 992.7 million,  has about 237,696 subnational  bodies. It has 25 states
and  seven urban  territories.  Its urban  local bodies  consist  of 95 municipal  corporations,  1,436
municipal  councils, and 2,055  nagar  panchayats.  In rural  areas,  474 zila parishads  wield  some author-
ity over the 5,906 panchayats  samithis. The panchayats  samithis in turn have some authority  over the
227,698 gram panchayats.
15  A strong  economy  like  Japan has two  subnational  tiers  with  47 intermediate  and  3,233 local
bodies.  Canada has 12  intermediate  governments and 4,507  local bodies. The United  States  has 50
states and  70,500 local bodies.
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while Thailand is divided into 75 changwats.  At the local level, the Philippines
is subdivided into city/municipal  governments.  Each  municipality is further
subdivided into barangays.  The number of subnational bodies in the Philip-
pines is six times more than that of Thailand. The latter currently has 149
elected city governments,  1,050  sanitary districts in thickly populated subur-
ban areas,  and about 7,823  tam  bon  administrative organizations, which are
the standard form of government in rural areas  (Das Gaiha 2001).
Laos had a fairly decentralized  government until early 1991  when it de-
cided to revert to a more centralized setup. Now the central government
organizes,  directs and supervises  the operations of state services  in  all sec-
tors, including local administrative organizations. Before 1991,  the state ad-
ministration consisted  of five tiers: central government, provinces, districts,
tassengs  (subdistricts),  and villages. With the abolition of tassengs,  the number
of subnational tiers has been reduced to three. There are now 16 provinces,
141 districts, and 11,293  villages.
The recentralization has adverse distributional consequences.  The deci-
sion to aggregate  services, administration and infrastructure-ostensibly  to
make management  easier-clashes with the harsh realities of rugged topog-
raphy and ethnic diversity, and the need for community involvement, all of
which favor smaller local administrative units. As a result, a large number of
villages have wea~ government  presence  (Das Gaiha 2001).
The Laotian case  illustrates the need for smaller districts for better gov-
ernance, but it does not lend itself to generalization. The cost-effectiveness
of public  provision  of services may depend on how size of jurisdiction  is
determined. In the Philippines, the process  of district multiplication is more
the result of exogenous  gerrymandering maneuvers of legislators (which in
many cases  disregard economies  of scope)  than of endogenously  determined
social benefit-cost outcomes.
Fiscal Decentralization
Economist  Wallace  Oates  has  held that responsibility for providing each
public service  should be exercised  at the level of government  having control
over the area that would  assume  the benefits and costs of such provision.
The jurisdiction which decides  how much of a public good ought to be pro-
vided should include precisely the set of individuals  that consume it.  In a
related fashion, the principle of subsidiarity states  that service delivery func-
tions should be made at the lowest level of government  unless a persuasive
case  can be argued for assigning  them to a higher level of government  (Shah
1994).
To allocate responsibility efficiently in the delivery of local public goods
is to match local expenditures more closely with  local priorities and prefer-
ences.  It also means  making sure responsibility is accompanied  by authority
to raise the revenues required to meet the local government's obligations.
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That entails devolving the powers of expenditure and revenue collection to
subnational governments.
To begin with, Asian subnational governments  have a hard time financ-
ing their spending. All the countries shown in Figure 37 have income short-
falls at subnationallevels, although Malaysia and Thailand come close to a
more balanced  relationship  between  revenue  and expenditure below the cen-
tral government.  If revenue  means  are not matched closely  with expenditure
needs  at subnationallevels,  the central government  must  close  the gap through
fiscal transfers.  But each  national government  faces  its own fiscal constraints
and can in extreme  cases  simply pass  on its fiscal deficits  to subnational  units.
But even without  the constraints,  central to  local transfers can be quite
distortionary  in nature.
Expenditure  assignment.  Some  public goods  can  be provided less expen-
sively on a larger scale.  Centralized provision benefits the entire economy,
creates  economies of scale, achieves "equalization of access,"  and captures
spillovers. Yet there is a tradeoff. Centralization imposes a single  policy on
jurisdictions with varied  needs  and preferences.  Moreover,  some  public goods
are of a localized nature, with limited externalities.  Thus, in allocating func-
tions to various tiers of government, there must be a sense  of balance be-
tween readiness  to respond to local needs and consciousness  of the goal of
scale  economies  (Shah  1994).
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It goes without  saying that defense, foreign affairs, currency banking,
international trade, immigration, and domestic market preservation should
remain the responsibility of central government, as they are national public
goods. On the other hand, subnational bodies should provide local public
goods.  This "division of labor," common  to OECD  countries,  also  finds ground
in  Southeast Asia.  Many  services like  industry  and  agriculture, educa-
tion, health, social  welfare,  police, environmental  management  and even  public
works are increasingly decentralized or assigned as joint  responsibility  of
central and subnational  governments.  Table 6 shows which government  lev-
els in  Southeast  Asia are responsible for the different expenditure assign-
ments (which mean setting the amount, determining the structure, executing,
and supervising) vis-a-vis the provision of certain services.
Many services in sectors like  industry  and agriculture, health, educa-
tion, and welfare contain both national and local public goods elements  and
are now the joint responsibility of many subnational  governments,  especially
those  in Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and the Philippines.  However, concurrency  raises
hard issues  on how well each  tier's responsibilities  are delineated  (Das  Gaiha
2001).  Public works, natural resources  and the environment are still  central
concerns.  In the Philippines, local governments  are responsible  for the execu-
tion of social  services  like health care,  and regulatory functions such as agri-
cultural land reclassification.  In the case  of Vietnam, primary and preschool
education  is the main responsibility of the local governments.  However, uni-
versities, hospitals, and interurban highways are completely controlled by
the central government.
Sources  of  basic  data:  Shah  (1994);  World  Bank  Qualitative  Decentralization  Indicators;  Philippine  Local
Government  Code  of  1991.
Legend:  C  =  responsibility  of  federal  or  central  government;  S  =  responsibility  of  subnational  governments,
e.g.,  state,  provincial,  departmental  or  local  government;  CIS  = joint  responsibility  of  national  and  subnational
governments.
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Tax assignment.  Decentralization  of expenditure must come with a cor-
responding decentralization in revenue generation  (that is, taxation). Other-
wise, local governments will  depend heavily on transfers and grants from
national government to support devolved functions. Likewise, local govern-
ments will  have little incentive to deliver government  services  competitively
and be Innovative.
How much autonomy do subnational governments  have in raising rev-
enues? Subnational revenues generally consist of tax and nontax revenue,
intergovernmental transfers and grants. Certainly, the greater  the fiscal au-
tonomy, the higher the degree  of decentralization.  Some  Asian countries  have
devolved expenditure without  increasing revenues for subnational govern-
ments and/ or delegating tax collection to subnational governments, thus
putting  fiscal pressures on local governments and/ or making them depen-
dent on intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
Subnational  governments in Southeast  Asian countries present  varying
fiscal capacities  (see  Figure 38). Thailand's local governments  have the high-
est share of tax revenues as a percentage of total subnational expenditures
(over 60 percent). This is comparable to China's, demonstrating high local
government autonomy relative to other subnational governments in Asia.
The lower shares,  registered by local units in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, are smaller than that of India.
Thailand is on a roll as far as giving its local authorities more taxing
power is concerned.  The Thai government is currently designing a frame-
work on decentralization  based on its National Decentralization  Act of 1999,
Source: IMF Governament Finance Statistics
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and projects  local shares to rise to 35 percent  of total  revenues  by 2006. To
meet the  target  for  2006, local governments  may need to  double  their  own
revenue  collection  from  the  present  level  of 1.5 percent  of GDP (Das Gaiha
2001). The Philippine  Congress has also broadened  the powers  of local gov-
ernment  units  to  levy  taxes and fees. Yet an increase in  central-local  fiscal
transfers  (called  the  internal  revenue  allotment)  from  11 percent  to 40 per-
cent is in  many cases a disincentive  in  expanding  local tax bases.
What accounts for the poor showing  of subnational  governments in  most
of  Southeast Asia  in  tax generation?  In  spite  of attempts  at devolution,  cen-
tral  governments  in  the  region  retain  control  of  tax  determination  and  ad-
ministration.  Most  subnational  governments  in Asia  have  limited  revenue
collection  on their  own due to limited  knowledge  of and access  to  their  own
tax bases.
Table 7 summarizes  the involvement  of subnational  governments in  set-
ting  the  rate  and  administering  the  most  common  types  of taxes  that  are
relevant  at the  subnationallevel.  It  also shows  the  tax shared  (or piggy-
backed) by  central and  subnational  governments.  Most of the taxes listed  in
the  table  are still  centrally  collected  and  administered.  Only  property  taxes
and local fees are within  the domain  of local governments)6 except in Indone-
sia, where  property  tax remains  a central levy.  Malaysia's  customs duty,  or-
dinarily  a central  tax in  Asian  countries,  is  concurrently  administered  by its
subnational  governments.
Excise is the most commonly  shared tax by central and subnational  gov-
ernments.  Local  authorities  piggyback  on resource taxes.  A  budget  law  in
Vietnam,  enacted in  1997, formalized  levy  of charges, fees, surcharges, and
collection  of voluntary  contributions  by  local governments.
Indonesia  is  an example  of a grossly  centralized  tax assignment.  The
central  government  sets the  instrument,  base, rate,  and  collection  of  most
taxes (e.g., property,  sales, excise, industry  and  trade,  natural  resource).  It
is  therefore  not  surprising  that  subnational  governments  in  Indonesia  de-
pend  highly  on  transfers  from  the  national  government.  As  a consolation,
local  units  share taxes on natural  resources and participate  in  determining
tax rates for vehicles  (WDR 1999/2000).
16m  China,  the  central  government  shares  a number  of tax  responsibilities  with subnational  govern-
ments especially  in administering levy on income/gifts, estates,  sales,  excises,  property, among
others.  Revenues  from value-added  tax,  resource,  and security  exchimge  levies  are  also  shared  with
the provincial governments  (for instance,  a 50:50  sharing of V  AT proceeds).  m milia, except  for
customs,  estate  and corporate taxes,  all other taxes are assigned  to/shared with  subnational
governments.  Given  the  scope  of tax  assignment,  it is not  surprising that  local  governments  in China
and mdia collect  the highest  subnational  tax  revenues  in Asia.
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Table 7.  Tax  assignment  in selected  Southeast  Asian  countries.
Type  of tax
~
Customs










Source  of basic  data:  Shah  (1994).
Legend:  C = tax  base,  rate  and  administration  assigned  to  federal  or  central  government;
S  =  assigned  to  state,  provincial,  departmental  or  local  government;
CIS  =  shared  responsibility  or  piggybacked
Delinking taxing from spending responsibilities often leads to account-
ability problems at subnationallevels. If tax and expenditure assignments  are
not determined simultaneously, so that revenue means  harmonize with  ex-
penditure needs, local governments may not feel answerable for fiscaldefi-
ciencies  and the resulting poor service  provision. Yet, as tax and expenditure
matching is not easily resolved, it  may be worth  it to examine the role of
intergovernmental  transfers,  as a way of mitigating local accountability  short-
falls (Huther and Shah 1998).
Intergovernmental  transfers. Since most subnational  governments in Asia
have limited  revenue  collection  on their  own,  they depend  heavily  on trans-
fers from  national  government.  Dependency  of subnational  governments can
be discerned  from  vertical  imbalance.  Decentralization  in  Southeast Asia has
a mixed  record,  based  on  data  in  Figure  39.  Vertical  imbalance,  which  is
measured  by  intergovernmental  transfers  as a share of subnational  expendi-
ture,  indicates  the degree to  which  subnational  governments  rely  on central
government  revenues  to  support  their  spending needs.
Of the seven Asian  countries  for  which  data  on vertical  imbalance  are
available, Malaysia (17.21 percent) seems to have the least need for central dis-
bursements. Thailand  (32.33  percent), along with  regional neighbors India (36.11
percent), China  (38.9 percent), and Mongolia  (42.6 percent), is moderately  de-
pendent on central allotments. In Indonesia (at a high  of 74.24 percent) and the
Philippines  (62.66  percent), intergovernmental  transfers are the main sources of
revenue  of subnational  units,  indicating  a very  high  degree of central depen-
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dence. 17  By comparison, decentralization pacesetters  in  Latin America,  such as
Bolivia  (47.58 percent),  Brazil  (34.39 percent) and Mexico  (35.41 percent),  get
less than half  of their spending needs from central resources.I8
In the Philippines,  the extent of intergovernmental  transfers can be gauged
from  the  internal  revenue  allotments  (IRAs)  for  local  governments,  which
have increased substantially  since the passage of the Local Government  Code
in  1991. As  a proportion  of the  total  Philippine  budget,  the  IRA  increased
from  6.7 percent in  1992 to 20 percent in the year 2000. In absolute terms, the
IRA increased from PhP9.8 billion  in 1991 to PhP121.8 billion  in 2000, translat-
ing  to  an average growth  rate  of 32 percent (Diokno  2000).
Vertical  imbalance  suggests  that  control  of  central  governments  on
subnational  governments  in  Southeast Asian  countries  persists  as the  latter
continue  to be hounded  by  fiscal underperformance.  Shah (1994), using the
coefficient  of vertical  imbalance  or an index of subnational  autonomy  to mea-
sure the  degree  of  control  exercised  by the  central  government  over  lower
levels  of government  in selected countries, finds  that central control  is strong
in  Indonesia,  India,  Pakistan,  and  even in  Australia,  an OECD member.  But
in  Brazil,  federal  influence  over  local priorities  is quite  limited,  making  its
municipal  governments  the envy  of  subnational  governments  in  both devel-
17  Poorer  regions  in Indonesia  depend  on  subsidies  from  the  central  governmerit.  Decentralization  in
the  country  is proceeding  slowly because  of fiscal  risks,  but its  more important implication may  be
to deprive poor areas  of resource  transfers,  thus  exacerbating  inequities.  There  are suggestions  to
increase  the  weighting  given to  poverty indicators  among  the  criteria  for  a region  getting  "balancing
funds" from the  central  government  (International mEA 2000).
180btained  from the IMP Government  Finance  Statistics.
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oped  and  developing  countries.  In  Laos, the  central  government  pays  about
85 percent  of the  budget  resource  of the public  sector appropriated  to  the
Public  Investment  Plan  for  local  governments  through  each line  ministry.
Curiously,  in  this setup,  the  local governments  manage the public  expendi-
ture  of the line  ministries  (JBIC 2001).
Intergovernmental  transfer  initiatives  in  Vietnam  have become impor-
tant in the light  of its need to  maintain  rapid  growth,  which  in  turI:l depends
on infrastructure  support  and  provision  of public  services  along diversified
regional  requirements.  The  1997 budget  law  attempts  to  link  expenditure
responsibilities  to the revenue  assignment  of each level  of government  with
the  budgetary  process as the  means to  integrate  revenues and expenditures
at all  levels.  A  system  of  assignment  and transfers  will  remain  in force  for
three  to  five  years..
Transfers  are often  in the  form  of grants.  Local governments  obviously
want  unconditional  grants without  matching  funds,  as they provide  leeway
in spending.  Central authorities,  on the other hand,  may wish  to direct  grants
toward  expenditures  that pursue  national  objectives (e.g., public  health).  In
such cases, conditional  grants  ensure compliance.  If  matched  with  local re-
sources, they ensure  local  ownership  of the processes and  outcomes  arising
from  the  grants.  The experience  of Indonesia  offers  important  insights  in
grant  design. Indonesia's  education  and  health grants use simple  and objec-
tively  quantifiable  indicators  in  allocating  funds.  Conditions  for  the contin-
ued  eligibility  of these grants  stress objective  standards  of access to  these
services. Grants  for public  sector wages  on the  other hand,  represent an ex-
ample  of an inadequately  designed  scheme, as they introduce  incentives  for
higher  public  employment  at subnationallevels  (Huther  and Shah 1998).
Subnational  borrowings.  Local  borrowing  to  augment  local  expendi-
ture  remains a major  issue in  many  Southeast Asian  countries.  Lack of data
on  subnational  loans hampers  analysis  of the  borrowing  behavior  of  local
governments,  especially  if borrowing  regulations  induce  moral  hazard  prob-
lems.  Table  8, however,  provides  useful  perspectives  on the  regulation  of
subnational  borrowings  in  the  region.
Of the three  Southeast Asian  economies represented  in the  table,  only
Indonesia allows  subnational borrowings,  but with  tight administrative  guard-
ing from the center. Thailand  and Vietnam do not permit  lending to subnational
units.  Local  government  units  in  the Philippines  are also allowed  to  borrow
in the market by floating  bonds.  Comparing  it to decentralization  benchmark
countries  in  Latin  America  suggests how  far behind  Southeast Asia  is in the
development  of  subnational  borrowing  instruments  and  regulations.  In  Ar-
gentina, Bolivia,  Mexico,  and Brazil,  tax  sharing can be used as loan  guaran-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































>and local debt service arrangements  are well developed in these  countries}9
All  things considered, Sou~f:jSt Asian naqons have a lo~  road ahead
in fiscal decentralization. As shown in Table 9; which sizes  up fiscal decen-
tralization  in terms of subnational expenditure and subnational taxes as a
proportion of total budget and total taxes,  respectively,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines are way off the mark set by China and India in
both expenditure and tax departments.
Voice and Participation at Local Levels
Voice depends on the degree  to which the public can influence the qual-
ity and quantity of a service through some form of articulation of preferences
(Manasan  et al. 1999).  Voice can be in the form of representation  arising from
election  results.  In Table 10, subnational  interests  in the Philippines and Thai-
land are protected through the election of representatives in intermediate
and local bodies. In these countries, the voting power of citizens over local
authorities helps exact greater accountability from government.
In the transition  economies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, decen-
tralization has taken place with little  citizen power. In Laos,  provincial gov-
ernors are appointed by the central government. Village chiefs whose main
responsibilities  are law enforcement  and implementation  of instructions from
higher authorities, are the only elected  representatives  at the local level.
Citizen participation is possible only if political freedom (voice and exit)
is allowed and political stability holds sway. Exit considers  the ability of the
public to explore other options when dissatisfied with public services  while
190btained from  the World  Bank Qualitative  Decentralization  Indicators.
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Source  of  basic  data:  World  Development  Report  1999/2000.
Notes:
Intermediate  means  state,  province,  region,  departments,  or other  elected  entity
between  local  and  the  national  government.
Local  means  municipality  or equivalent.
In Cambodia,  local  elections  are  planned  for  late  1999  or  early  2000.  A  law  is
being  drafted  to  define  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  elected  commune
officials.
No+  indicates  that  although  the  legislature  is elected,  a  nominated  executive
head  (for example,  a  mayor  or  governor)  holds  significant  powers.
voice takes into  account the ability  of the public  to  exert pressure on provid-
ers to perform  well.  Huther  and Shah (1998) combine the individual  rankings
of countries  on these indicators  to  develop  a composite  index  of citizen par-
ticipation.  They find  that  citizen  participation  and public  sector accountabil-
ity  go hand  in  hand  with  decentralized  public  sector decisionmaking.  When
the citizen  participation  index is paired  with  the depth of localization  in Asia,
localization  and  participation  move  together,  but  only  tenuously,  with  re-
spect to  Southeast Asian  countries. In Figure  40, Malaysia  scores well  in  both
localization  and  citizen  participation.  Indonesia,  the Philippines  and Thai-
land  have  poor  to  fair  degrees of  participation  and  low  levels  of decentrali-
zation.  Neighboring  China  may be very  good in  localization  but citizen power
is  almost  nonexistent.
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests the  strong  power  of  citizen  participation.
Community  mobilization  in  Thailand,  despite  uneven  results,  managed  to
help alleviate  economic hardships  in  rural  areas in the aftermath  of the Asian
crisis.  A  viable  partnership  between  people's  organizations  and  NGOs  in
Naga  City  in  the Philippines  formalized  the  participation  of local communi-
ties in  identifying  development  priorities.  The Kaantabay  sa Kauswagan,  a key
urban  development  program,  managed  to  distribute  government  land  to
the  city's  poor  population,  upgraded  slum  housing,  and  engaged  in  land
banking  for  future  housing  projects  (Das Gaiha 2001).
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Localization  and  Corruption
Corruption  can reduce the gains from  decentralization.  But decentraliza-
tion can reduce the risks and benefits of corruption.  In  a decentralized system,
citizens can curb the incentives  for  corruption  by  learning  about government
activities and filing  complaints (voice). They can also counter bribery demands
by moving  out of the system or "voting  with  their feet"  (exit) (UNDP 1997).
Fisman and  Gatti  (2000) find  that  fiscal  decentralization  is  consistently
associated with  minimal  corruption.  Countries  with  more  decentralized  ex-
penditure  have  better  corruption  ratings.  The size  of the  coefficient  implies
that  one standard  deviation  increase  in  decentralization  will  be associated
with  an  improvement  in  the country's  corruption  rating  of 40 percent  of a
standard  deviation.
Figure 41 validates this result. When the extent of decentralization is matched
with  Transparency International's  corruption  perception index,  what becomes
apparent is the negative  association between them,  at least in  certain parts of
Southeast  Asia.  Indonesia, which  has the worst  corruption  rating in the region,
is also the least localized.  At the other end of the spectrum is Malaysia, which
combines a higher  level of decentralization with  a lower  level of corruption.  In
the Philippines,  corruption  is less pronounced in  lower  levels (Azfar  et at. 2000)
and is fairly decentralized. Notice that in highly  devolved systems such as Swit-
zerland, corruption  is least.  The same is true  with  the US and Argentina,  to a
lesser extent.
67Earlier findings  by Huther and Shah (1998)  also confirm the negative
correlation between  fiscal decentralization  and corruption. A composite  rank-
ing of countries on three indicators, namely, judicial efficiency, bureaucratic
efficiency, and the lack of corruption, provides a good measure of govern-
ment orientation.  Huther and Shah then relate the degree of expenditure
decentralization  to the ranking of countries on individual indicators as well
as to the composite rank on government orientation. They find  that all of
these correlations show a positive, and statistically significant, association.
This suggests  that a decentralized  country is more responsive  to citizen needs
and preferences  in service delivery than centralized countries.
Several  case  studies  corroborate  these  findings. Blair (1996),  citing the Phil-
ippines' more recent  experience  with decentralization,  concludes  that decentral-
ized democratic  governance  has a positive impact on the quality of governance,
especially  in reorienting government from a command-and-control  role to a
service  provider role. Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996)  report that for a large
sample  of countries  decentralization  leads  to lower unit administration  costs  for
road services.  Decentralization  also increases  productive efficiency  in the Phil-
ippines by limiting the leakage  of funds and other sources  (Azfar et al. 2000).
Beyond these  evidences,  there is still the possibility that decentralization
can worsen corruption. Subnational  governments  can still be captured by the
local elite especially  in areas  where there is inequitable distribution of assets
(Das  Gaiha  2001).  Local elections  that create  opportunities  to get  the voice of the
citizens  heard can be controlled by the elite, since they are usually the candi-
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dates  themselves  or they bankroll the candidacy  of chosen  subordinates.  Poten-
tiallosses from decentralized procurement  can also be staggering. With less
oversight, since the cost of monitoring is prohibitive,  local governments  are
more susceptible  to capture by or collusion with local contractors.
Central to any country strategy to combat corruption is the creation of
citizen-led demand for better delivery of services.  However, this, too, can
be hamstrung by collective action problems as well as information barriers
facing the public.
Decentralization,  Growth,  and Poverty
The quality  of local governance,  according to Manasan et al. (1999),  is
determined by the overall capacity of subnational governments  to mobilize
and utilize resources,  deliver public services  in an efficient and effective  man-
ner, ~d  ensure accountability-all  of which are prerequisites  of good socio-
economic  performance  and growth.  Asia's experience  shows that.  decentrali-
zation and growth go together (Figure 42). China, the frontrunner, has the
deepest local base and the highest GDP per capita average annual growth
rate in the period 1990-1999.  Malaysia is not far behind. In Indonesia,  Thai-
land, and the Philippines, weaker decentralized  structures also translate  into
weaker growth rates.
Decentralization  is also correlated  with human development.  Huther and
Shah (1998)  find  that fiscal decentralization  is positively correlated with two
indices  of social  development:  human development  and income  inequality.  The
Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics; World Development Repolt 2002.
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human  development  index  (HDI)  incorporates  life  expectancy, adult  literacy,
educational emollments, and per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms.
But has decentralization  helped  the  poor  in  Southeast Asia?
The outcome  of decentralization  in Asia  depends  on whether  influential
groups  are being  "coopted"  or challenged in  the process of devolving  power
and resources to subnational  governments.  In a recent survey of decentraliza-
tion and poverty  alleviation in Asia, Das Gaiha (2001)  claims that although greater
local economy and expanded resource base of local governments are likely  to
lead to some efficiency  gains and benefits to the poor,  it is  doubtful  whether
these are widely  shared. Decentralization has generally not benefited the poor
in Asia.
Box 1.  H~ve  the  poor  in  Southeast  Asia  gained  from  decentralization?
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Policy Recommendations
Weak governance  and  poorly  functioning  public  institutions  have held
back growth  in  Southeast Asian  countries.  The economic  downturn  uncov-
ered  high  levels  of  corruption  and  poor  fiscal  management,  and provoked
political  instability.  The  transition  economies  were  somewhat  spared  from
the crisis.  But  "distortions"  in  their  economies also restrained  growth.
To  accelerate broad-based  and  equitable  growth  and  prevent  another
economic  shock,  the  region  needs major  reforms  in  governance  and  public
institutions.  Southeast Asia's  hope  of recovering  and  accelerating its  growth
momentum  depends  on measures to be instituted  to  increase transparency
and  accountability,  make  regulations  and  incentives  more  responsive,  en-
hance the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  enabling  and  transmission  mecha-
nisms,  and build  constituencies  for reforms.
Transparency  and  Accountability
Regardless  of  their  individual  levels  of  development,  Southeast Asian
countries  need  to  establish and  strengthen  their  transparency  and  account-
ability  structures.
Southeast  Asian central  governments  need  to define  the boundaries  of their
functions to detennine  their accountabilities.  The key assignment  roles of cen-
tral governments  are to ensure  provision of public goods  and handle  macroeco-
nomic management.  That suggests  that each central government  should limit
itself to steering  while letting the other key players  in society,  such as the pri-
vate sector  and civil society,  do the  rowing. Operationally,  this  means  rightsizing
governments,  which in part is accomplished  by pursuing  privatization.  Acceler-
ated privatization in Indonesia  and reforms  in state-owned  enterprises  in Viet-
nam are examples  of recent  donor-supported  moves along  these  lines.
By shedding provisioning functions  and allowing markets  to work, South-
east  Asian governments  can  raise  public sector  efficiency  and reduce  the strain
on  public finances,  thus promoting greater  accountability.  Rightsizing of South-
east  Asian governments  is in order but must be done cautiously. For some,
like Thailand and the Philippines, a bit of expansion  may have to take place
before Southeast  Asian governments  can settle to a slimmer size and achieve
a balance  between size of government, growth and human welfare.
71While  pushing  for  greater private  sector participation,  reforms  in provi-
sioning  public  goods  must  consider  the  capability  of the  market  to provide
these goods. Governments  will  have to take ultimate  responsibility,  but  gov-
ernment  intervention  should  not be worse  than  what  the  market  is  ineffi-
ciently  or ineffectively  providing.  For example, the record  of Southeast Asian
governments  is better  in  enlarging  access to  electricity  through  greater par-
ticipation  of the private  sector. The presence of multiple  providers  adds  to
high  institutional  quality  in  highly  populated  areas. In  remote  areas with
many  poor  people,  where  private  entry  is  not forthcoming,  the  provision  of
these services must  rest with  the state.
If  privatization  makes central  governments  do  their  job better,  so does
transfer  of  functions  to  subnational  governments,  which  is another shedding
mode. The  aim is to  decongest the  central  government  of direct service pro-
vision.  The World  Bank,  for  instance,  is  recommending  to  reform  manage-
ment of education in Vietnam  by appropriate  decentralization.  In many South-
east Asian  countries,  a corollary  objective  of  decentralization  is to  remove
concurrency,  which  raises hard  questions  on which  level  of government  has
true  accountability.  Specifically,  si!rvices  assigned  as joint  responsibility  of
central  and  subnational  governments  like  industry  and  agriculture,  educa-
tion,  health,  social  welfare,  police,  environmental  management,  and  even
public  works  need  to be clear-cut.  Exceptions  are cases where  subnational
government  capacity  is  weak  (e.g.,  construction  of massive  infrastructure
like  farm-to-market  roads, bridges,  telecomm\mication  facilities  and the like).
In  these instances, central  government  cannot immediately  relinquish  its re-
sponsibility.  Concurrency  is  necessary when  central  government  is devolv-
ing.  Handholding  ensures that subnational  units  are able to  absorb the func-
tions  corresponding  to  their  capacity  levels.  Decentralization  in  Southeast
Asia  must proceed  with  economies of scale in  mind  and  caution to  forestall
reversals  or recentralization,  as in  the case of Laos.
Once central government responsibility  is defined, it  should have the
resources  required to discharge its  streamlined functions.  The state has to
generate  revenue to fulfill  its responsibility. As the findings indicate, most
Southeast  Asian governments are saddled with  unbalanced budgets-rev-
enues  are not sufficient to support vital expenditure, especially  spending for
basic social services. Even domestic and international borrowings  are not
enough to close the financing gap. Hence, tax reform is an indispensable
component of any governance  improvement package  in Southeast  Asia. The
urgent need is for more efficient and more accountable  tax management.  At
the very least, eliminating individual  discretion and defining taxing author-
ity more clearly in tax agencies  would  be a step in the right direction. Tax
reform also means shifting from international to domestic taxation, a move
72Policy  Recommendations
that  would  place  a heavy  burden  on  domestic  tax  collection  agencies. To
prepare  for  such eventuality,  these agencies  must  be able to  expand  their
domestic  tax bases, a shift  that  would  require  increased  answerability  for
high  collection  efficiency.
Indonesia, the Philippines,  and the transition  economies in Southeast Asia
are facing  tough  challenges to raise revenues  through  better  tax administra-
tion  and  fiscal  management.  Laos,  according  to  the  World  Bank,  requires
specific  policy  measures  to  improve  transparency  and  efficiency  in  public
budgeting  and  execution and revenue  collection  and control.  Tax reforms  are
needed  to  increase the  share  of domestic  direct  and  indirect  taxes, reduce
reliance  on trade  taxes and royalties,  and  broaden  the income  tax base.
As Southeast Asian governments  fulfill  their obligations,  they must avoid
wastages  in  procurement  and  tendering  processes, the  sources of  leakages
on the  expenditure  side.  The more  advanced  countries  in  the  region  have
made  progress  in public  expenditure  management.  The Philippines,  for  in-
stance, has adopted  electronic  bidding,  allowed  civil  society groups  to orga-
nize  procurement  watchdogs,  revised  rules  to make the  procurement  trans-
actions  more  transparent,  and  forged  integrity  pacts  with  private  firms.
Southeast Asian  countries  where  corruption  in public  procurement  is per-
ceived  to  be  rampant  (e.g. Indonesia  and  Thailand)  can benefit  from  these
experiences.
As the private sector increasingly  becomes  involved in the provision of
goods and services  erstwhile supplied by government, it  must improve its
own public  accountability structure. Establishing  and strengthening the ac-
countability  of the private  sector means enhancing its readiness  to absorb
risk. Private sector risk-taking, in which obligations are self-guaranteed by
the sector, would  keep the government from providing  bailout options in
cases  of default, thus reducing moral hazard.
Another critical area for reform is corporate governance.  A key step is
to increase  disclosure  and protect the public interest  in publicly listed corpo-
rations  (in the case  of Southeast  Asian countries  with working stock  exchanges)
and state-owned enterprises (especially in the transition economies  of Viet-
nam, Laos, and Cambodia). In Vietnam, for example, what is urgent is to
accelerate  the reform of state-owned enterprises, especially debt-strapped
parastatals that drain public funds. Public accountability of firms participat-
ing in the provision of public goods must be strengthened  through transpar-
ent rules and independent auditing and accounting  procedures.
Fair  governance  requires  increasing  access to  basic services by the de-
prived  and  disadvantaged  segments of  the populations  of  Southeast  Asian
countries.  Problems  of access  to basic services are more  severe in  the transi-
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tion  states (e.g., Laos,  Cambodia)  and  those with  high  levels  of ethnic  con-
flict  (e.g., Indonesia).  Yet, paradoxically,  the  solution  is to  widen  the access
to these services. The governance perspective  permits  shifting  of focus to the
poor  and  disadvantaged  sectors  of  Southeast  Asian  societies, since  part  of
overall  accountability  is to promote  social equity  as a corollary  to  economic
growth.  To enlarge  coverage, the  less developed  Southeast Asian  countries
burdened  by revenue shortfalls  must  allow  flexibility  in  quality  and price  of
provisions,  especially  in  water  supply  and sanitation.  They should  likewise
encourage  liberal  entry  of informal  providers  at levels where  high  standards
are not required,  as long  as users and  informal  providers  agree on set stan-
dards  that do  not compromise  quality  and safety. Public  spending  on social
services must be high  on the agenda of both donors and the governments  of
Southeast Asian  countries.
In  Laos, the  main  challenge  for  the  government  is to provide  equitable
access to  a basic minimum  standard  of education  services. Laos, Cambodia,
and Myanmar  need to put more  of their resources in  social services. Vietnam
needs reforms  to  widen  access to basic social services, especially  among the
disadvantaged  groups.  Provision  of  education  is  urgent  to  meet high-level
manpower  needed  for  the  transformation  of its economy.  To be able to  in-
crease public  resources  going  to preventive  health  care, Vietnam  must  en-
courage private  provision  of curative  health care. All  countries  are currently
getting  World  Bank  support  and  encouragement  for  these efforts.
Subnational governments  in Southeast  Asia need  to strengthen  their au-
tonomy to bolster overall government accountability in  achieving broad-
based  growth.  Making subnational governments more independent and ac-
countable requires fiscal decentralization-that  is, the ability to finance their
expenditures with revenues within  their control. A clearer definition of ac-
countabilities is needed, such as determining tax and expenditure assign-
ments across  levels of government. Allocation and spending rules, for one,
must be clearly set, such  as those for social  expenditure and the 20/20 initia-
tive. Such  accountability  measures  are important as central government  flfnc-
tions are devolved to prevent decentralizing  even the failings of governance,
such as corruption. Efforts to increase  autonomy of subnational  governments
must not be devoid of reform.. in intergovernmental fiscal relations to close
the vertical imbalance,  which is persistent  in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Eliminating vertical imbalance  in  many Southeast  Asian countries calls
for a transfer of more taxing powers to subnational  governments.  That way,
decentralization  can proceed with  equity in  terms of allocation of resources
and responsibilities. Subnational governments will  be motivated to take on
tax assignments  and increase  tax collection efficiency if they are allowed to
keep the taxes they collect.
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As  government  functions  are decentralized,  the  complexity  by  which
these  functions  are discharged  must  be removed.  Without  losing  controls,
rules  corresponding  to these functions  should  be made simpler.  The  level  of
sophistication  of rules  to  be enforced  by  subnational  governments  should
match  the  level  of  sophistication  of  their  capacity.  Even  when  expenditure
functions  are substantially  decentralized,  certain instruments  such as match-
ing  grants  must  be introduced  to  allow  the  central  government  to  muster
local resources in line  with  national  priorities  and to influence  the  spending
patterns  of  subnational  governments.
Flexibility  also  means that  rules  can be adapted  to  respond  to  unique
situations.  For example,  in  cases where  there  is  civil  unrest  and  or ethnic
tension,  rules  must  give  subnational  governments  more  leeway  in  govern-
ing  ethnic  regions.
Civil  society  organizations (CSOs)  working in partnership with  the gov-
ernment  must be made accountable  for  their actions. Right now, it is hard to
make CSOs  accountable,  as they are not governed by rules and institutions
that are found  in government or in the private sector. Unlike  government
agencies, or private  firms,  CSOs may not have long shelf lives. They can
easily abandon their public responsibility. Thus, they must draft their own
partnering rules, entry and exit regulations, rules on information provision
and disclosure, and sanctions for misbehavior. In the Philippines, a large
CSO coalition, the CODE-NGO, has adopted an accountability framework
by crafting its own code of ethics.
CSOs articulating certain issues  are increasing  in number. With the rise
of civic movement and proliferation of NGOs, CSOs,  and people's organiza-
tions in Southeast  Asia, some  kind of accreditation  may be called for to sepa-
rate groups which cannot  be held accountable  for their action or non-action
and thus betray public trust.
The independence  of the judiciary-the  ultimate guarantor  of account-
ability-must  be secured.  The judiciary  in any country is the last bastion of
good governance. When all else fails, the judiciary is the only recourse for
arbitration and mediation. Prior to the Asian crisis, there was a positive per-
ception of the rule  of law in the region. Yet even as the high performing
Southeast  Asian economies  registered record-breaking growth rates, signs
of weak points in the judicial system  emerged.  Today, judicial independence
is grossly compromised  while judicial inefficiencies  continue to hurt the flow
of investments.  The ownership concentration  in Southeast  Asian firms is also
a telling sign of the low level of institutional  development of the legal sys-
tem. A turnaround in  Southeast  Asia would require further development of
the legal systems and reforms to enhance  judicial  independence and raise
judicial efficiency.
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The transparency of the judicial  processes  also needs to be increased. This
can be done by providing  civil  society and media with  timely judicial  informa-
tion.  Likewise,  setting up reliable and up-to-date judicial  data bases will  make
cases  easy to track and hard to manipulate. The concept of a court watch-<:ivil
society as monitors  of judges' performance-can  be adopted by Southeast  Asian
CSOs to increase pressure for change in the behavior of erring judges.
An  anticorruption  action  plan  will  provide  relief  where  corruption  is
pervasive.  High  levels  of corruption  undermine  the  legitimacy  of a number
of Southeast Asian  countries  and weaken  their  capacities to provide  institu-
tions  that  support  growth  and  development.  To  remove  this  obstacle  to
growth,  Southeast  Asian  countries  must  seriously  implement  counter-cor-
ruption  measures. A  national  anticorruption  plan,  owned  and sponsored  by
central  government  officials,  can help  prevent  wastage  of  government  re-
sources and  "state capture."  It is also a strong  accountability  mechanism.
A more  thorough  and country-specific  analysis of the factors that engen-
der  corruption  is  essential  in  designing  responsive  national  anticorruption
plans. Such plans must have both punitive  and preventive  measures and must
engage the  general public  in  the campai~.  Southeast Asian  countries  need
not  reinvent  solutions  since a menu  of anticorruption  instruments  is  readily
available.  The  World  Bank  has  been  instrumental  in  the  Philippine
government's  efforts  to  develop  a National  Anti-Corruption  Plan  in 2000.
The World  Bank is also assisting Indonesia  and Thailand  in  this regard.
Regulations and Incentives
A turnaround in Southeast  Asia would require more responsive  regula-
tory institutions and further development of incentives.
Concrete  actions include deregulating,  generating  positive incentives,  and
simplifying  transactions and entry procedures.  There is overwhelming evi-
dence that excessive  regulation and weak incentives  thwart economic  growth
in Southeast  Asia. The regulatory burden stalls trade and business  develop-
ment, especially in command economies  in the region (e.g.,  Laos and Viet-
nam). While  regulation for business entry is less in some Southeast  Asian
countries like Thailand and Singapore, stricter regulations (e.g., higher cost
of registration and complex  procedures for registering a business)  in the rest
of the region discourage  business  entry.
Revitalizing economic  activities is of paramount importance in reducing
poverty in  Southeast  Asia. Making the cost of doing business in Southeast
Asia more competitive requires removal of barriers on firm  entry and less
restrictive entry procedures. Actions of Southeast  Asian governments must
proceed along deregulation, development of incentives,  and simplification of
government requirements and procedures. Cambodia, for instance (accord-
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ing  to the ADB),  has considerable  potential  for  further  private  sector growth
in  manufacturing  and  services,  as demonstrated  by  the  proliferation  of
microenterprises,  small  and  medium  enterprises,  and  multinational  compa-
nies.  The  manufacturing  and  services  sector will  prosper  with  less restric-
tions  and  better  incentives.
The  priority  of policymakers  in  Southeast  Asian  economies,  weighed
down  by overregulation,  must  focus on facilitating  the entry  of more players
in the  market  and  alternative  providers  of public  goods and  services. Stan-
dardization  of laws  and  regulations  to reduce  enforcement  costs of transac-
tions across borders  (e.g., rules on entry  of products)  will  stimulate  free flow
of goods and services in the region thus, invigorating  Southeast Asian  econo-
mies.  When  not standardized,  the' goods  or services will  seek their  own  lev-
els and  turn  to  areas with  lesser restrictions.
Rewriting  exit rules may also be,  necessary  to prevent "hit-and-run"  invest-
ments. Southeast  Asia must tighten such rules so that private providers  of pub-
lic goods will  not readily  pull  out investments in  long-term projects with  lower
returns,  or exit in cases of default.  An appropriate  measure toward  this end is
setting  investment  targets and  making  private  providers  commit  to  providing
electricity  or water  supply  coverage within  a certain period.
Regulatory  reform  in  Southeast Asia  must also look  into  simplification
of rules  (e.g., international  and domestic  taxation  rules to facilitate  collection
of taxes). When  state enforcement  capacity is weak,  simpler  and less discre-
tionary  regulations  are less likely  to be undermined  by corruption.  The Phil-
ippine  government,  for instance, is trying  to simplify  taxation  by reformulat-
ing  the  corporate  tax code.  Under  this  scheme, firms  will  pay  a 20 to  26
percent  tax  on gross  income  instead  of the  current  32 percent  tax  on net
income.  The ADB  supports  improvements  in  tax administration,  elimination
Q.f  leaks and loopholes,  and  stricter  enforcement  of existing  tax laws.
High  dividends,  especially  for the underserved  segments of the popula-
tion,  are also expect~d if  Southeast Asian  governments  can adopt  more flex-
ible  rules  in  the  provision  of basic  services.  Unbundling  the  setting  up  of
infrastructure  for basic services, permitting  entry  of informal  providers  and
allowing  "mix-and-match"  arrangement,  such as local communities  provid-
ing  labor  in exchange for  lower  connection fees, will  widen  access  to needed
services.  Such demand-responsive  approaches, however,  need  to be linked
to  an effective  regulatory  framework  for  private-public  collaboration.
Southeast Asian  governments,  however,  must pursue  deref11lation bal-
anced by  consumer  protection  and in  consonance with  international  rules.  It
is acknowledged,  however,  that while  international  rules assume a level play-
ing  field,  Southeast Asian  countries  are at a disadvantage  in  terms  of devel-
oped institutions.  Deregulation  must thus proceed with  caution in areas where
Southeast Asian  states have  weak  institutional  defenses.
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Regulations  are likewise  needed to  break  interlocking  patterns  of busi-
ness-government  relations  and/or  business-political  party  relations-a  prac-
tice that constitutes grand  corruption  and spawns state capture in some South-
east Asian  countries.  Examples  of  reforms  in  this  sector are ADB-funded
programs  that  cover  improvement  of corporate  governance,  reinforcement
of regulatory  and  supervisory  arrangements, and  expansion of  investor base.
Such reforms  also  call  for  upgrading  of  standards  of  corporate  disclosure
and  tr~nsparency.  .
In  all of Southeast Asia, the effectiveness of the judiciary  is important  in
ensuring  fair  governance.  What  is  urgent  and  easily doable is to  reform  liti-
gation  procedures  to  fast-track  the  resolution  of  pending  and  new cases.
Deregulation  can help reduce the caseload of the judiciary/since  less regula-
tion  means fewer  burdens  on the courts.  A performance-based  merit  system
and competitive  pay for judges  will  likewise  go a long way in  improving  the
integrity  of the judiciary.
Enabling and Transmission Mechanisms
Transmission mechanisms can work  effectively through good enforce-
ment, innovation in  delivery and by encouraging  decentralization.
Curbing arbitrariness in government  actions requires  strong enforcement
mechanisms.  Good governance  means  predictability. Government is known
to impede the development  of markets  through the arbitrary exercise  of power.
Institutions that limit the state's capacity for arbitrary action will  improve its
ability to provide; institutions that support broad-based  markets.
As Southeast  Asian countries, especially  the transition economies,  move
toward  greater liberalization and people participation, new institutions are
needed. Building new institutions in some Southeast  Asian countries is not
easy  and would take time. Political conflicts or changeovers  can cause  rever-
sals of newly installed institutions.
While new institutions are being developed, Southeast  Asian countries
would also need interventions to enhance  existing mechanisms  such as civil
service and administrative  systems. Reforms in civil  service can include
meritocracy, development of management  cadre, and quality orientation for
frontline service  personnel.  The public sector  in some Southeast  Asian coun-
tries, especially those with  long "command-and-control" history may need
to be imbued with  client orientation to make them more responsive  to their
constituents.
The Southeast  Asia 5, in general, have many effective checks  and bal-
ances  on the actions of political leaders (e.g., separation  of powers, and the
presence  of veto points). Elections exist as another  veto point, but in South-
east  Asian economies  under a command-and-control  governance  framework,
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the extent of the electorate's participation  in elections is perceived as not
truly  representative of the citizens' voice. Voice mechanisms  that could be
strengthened include representation in subnational bodies, using civil soci-
ety as pressure point, and allowing users to determine/influence the deliv-
ery structure of government services.  Mechanisms  must also equip various
sectors, especially  ethnic groups, with veto powers.
Strengthening the rule  of law in Southeast  Asia is critical to ensuring
orderly, coherent,  and predictable goyemance  processes.  Corollary to this is
the need for more effective and forceful instruments for redress. Southeast
Asian countries need to strengthen their legal framework including anticor-
ruption institutions such as the Ombudsman.
Southeast  Asian governments  can adopt alternative delivery mechanisms
to widen people's access  to basic services.  In areas  where they do better than
government, private sector firms can participate in the provision of public
goods. Civil society organizations  can also serve  as government  substitute in
providing services  (e.g., in managing infrastructure and maintenance).  Gov-
ernments may also include  mechanisms that enable informal  providers to
serve areas not covered by major providers.
Delivery mechanisms  can also be enhanced  by devolving provision of
basic services like basic education and health to subnational governments.
Gradual takeover of functions must be done to prevent severe  disruption of
existing mechanisms.  Abrupt changes  could worsen the situation. Simply de-
centralizing the provision  of basic services to lower levels of government
may exacerbate  existing inequities or shift failings to levels even less  capable
of resolving them. Nonetheless,  if the capacity of local governments can be
improved,  then decentralization is a promising route toward a more effec-
tive delivery of social services.  If  they must do what central government  did
in the past, then improvements in the capacity of subnational governments
would be at par with  central government.
Subnational  governments  need  additional  instruments  to discharge  the  func-
tions devolved to them such as a mechanism for subnational borrowings.
Subnational  borrowings to augment  local expenditure  remain a major issue  in
many Southeast  Asian countries. Most of these  countries are still developing
subnational  borrowing instruments  and regulations.  They would benefit from
assistance  in de,,-eloping  local debt service  arrangements.  Assistance  to improve
revenue  generation  at the local level can yield high decentralization  dividends.
The rise of  ethnic  tensions in  Southeast Asia  implies  poor  conflict  man-
agement and  argues for  more efficient  public  institutions  to  bridge the gap
between differing  groups. Reforms are urgently  needed in  regions where  eth-
nic  tension is at its peak (e.g., Indonesia  and the Philippines).  To complement
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peacebuilding efforts, reforms are urgent in areas  where ethnic groups are
generally disadvantaged due to poor living conditions, poor infrastructure,
less access  to nonfarm work,  inferior access  to education, lack of access  to
water, sanitation, and electricity.  Negotiations and peace talks are critical
but access  to basic services and resources  will  accelerate  the peace  process
and make peace  enduring.
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Constituency Building
In  gearing  up  for  more  transparent,  accountable and  fair  governance in
Southeast Asia, the challenge lies in seeking allies and building  constituencies
for  reform.
The  first  step  in building constituencies  is to  identify those  who have the
incentives and influence to undertake the reforms. Constituency  building, in
conjunction with public pressure  and private sector  participation, is essential
to tip the scale in favor of regulatory reform, institutional changes,  and de-
velopment of more effective transmission  mechanisms.  The constituencies  of
governance  reforms in Southeast  Asia comprise the following players:
Government  career  executives  and  frontline  service  personnel:  They have
the incentive and influence to support reforms in civil service. Career  execu-
tives are instrumental in improving the quality of public management.  Front-
line service  personnel  can guarantee  quality, consistency,  and timely discharge
of government service at the point of delivery.
Private sector:  This sector  stands  to benefit  as government  sheds  its func-
tions.  Private entities offer alternative mechanisms  in the delivery of public
goods. But they ought to be able to take risks as they absorb government
functions.
Subnational governments:  They are the stalwarts of fiscal decentraliza-
tion.  They have high stakes in providing  basic services according to local
needs and preferences.
Central government:  Governance  reforms would  have to start from na-
tional governments. Central governments have the overall responsibility of
ensuring adequate  provision of critical public goods and maintaining social
order. The initiative to devolve functions and support decentralization  must
come from them.  Regulatory reform and development  of positive incentives
rest on central government.
Local communities: They are the source of demand-led activity.  They
can help ensure quality of public goods by complementing government in
managing local infrastructure projects and maintaining common facilities at
the local level.
Civil  society: This serves as strong pressure point  for reforms. Civil
society organizations  can be the watchdog of government decisions  and ac-
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tions.  They enhance  accountability by keeping government and the private
sector on their toes.
One way to build constituencies  is by supporting the interest of the ma-
jority. Another is by connecting  the community of reform actors through free
flow  of information.
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Principles  to  Consider
Improving governance  in Southeast  Asia requires a reform agenda that
is aimed toward  broad-based development and is designed based on the
peculiarities of Southeast  Asian economies.  While considering good interna-
tional practices,  governance  reforms  in Southeast  Asia must  build on the unique
historical and cultural makeup of the region and must be mindful of the level
of political and economic development of each  country.
The key to successful  interventions  on governance  effectiveness  in South-
east  Asia also  lies in the phased  introduction of reform packages.  Many South-
east  Asian economies  are already suffering from "reform fatigue:' and newer
and more urgent interventions may face stronger  resistance,  not because  they
constitute radical changes  but because  the countries  involved may have inad-
equate institutional  capacity to absorb the treatment.  Phasing also means
that the more crucial interventions to reduce poverty (such as widening the
poor's access  to basic services)  and to resolve internal conflict must be high
on the reform agenda.  Reforms  in the public sector  must target the core insti-
tutions: public finance, civil service,  legal institutions and the judiciary.
Sponsors  and implementors must likewise bear  in mind that they cannot
introduce more hard-hitting reforms in Southeast  Asia than have been pre-
scribed by international financing institutions like the I:MF and World Bank,
leaving the region under tremendous  pressure  to effect  political stability and
revive  their sluggish economies. They must also take precautionary mea-
sures  to protect the poorest  and marginalized segments  of the region's popu-
lation .from bearing the brunt of radical reforms.
The nature and extent of necessary  reforms in governance will  differ
across Southeast  Asia. The Southeast  Asia 5-Singapore,  Malaysia, Indone-
sia, Thailand and the Philippines-are  farther along the route to liberaliza-
tion and tripartism  (i.e., participation  of three key actors: the government,
the private sector,  and civil society in governance). They are generally  more
endowed with  managerial capacity, have more developed democratic sys-
tems and governance  structures, and thus would  mainly need assistance  in
institutional strengthening.
Younger  democracies  and transition  states  like Vietnam,  Laos,  Cambodia,
and Myanmar are trailing in the path toward open and competitive  economies.
They still have much to learn  in terms  of private sector  and civil society  partici-
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pation in governance. Thus, they will  benefit from assistance  in developing new
institutions,  transfer  of public  management, and participation  technology.
Public  sector reform  will  only take place when a country's  leaders are
committed  and  occupy  the driver's  seat. No  amount  of  help  will  strengthen
governance and  institutions  in  Southeast Asia  without  a strong political  will.
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Official  Development  Assistance
A.l  Aid  Effectiveness
Aid flows  in  Southeast  Asia. Aid  is usually associated  with official de-
velopment assistance  (ODA) from developed countries and is customarily
targeted to the poorest countries. ODA is a subset of official development
finance! and comprises  grants, plus concessionalloans  with at least  a 25 per-
cent grant component.  Aid can be bilateral or multilateral.  Some  bilateral aid
is tied, that is, it must be used to produce goods and services  from the donor
country2 (World  Bank 1998).
During the last few decades,  poverty has emerged  as the central  issue  in
the allocation of international aid. Following  the calls for global effort to
reduce poverty,  donors attempted to channel more official  aid to poorer
countries. The change  is characterized  by the adoption of poverty reduction
strategies of international institutions such as the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme,  the World Bank,  and the Asian Development  Bank to guide
development assistance  to low income countries.
This development is evident in Southeast  Asia, where a higher propor-
tion of aid goes  to lower-income and transition economies  such  as Laos,  Viet-
nam, and Cambodia (Figure AI).  Middle-income countries are getting less
development  assistance.  For the Southeast  Asia 5, the average  ODA disburse-
ment is less than 1.6 percent of GDP.
With increased income resulting from economic growth, countries be-
come less dependent on ODA. Figure A2 shows that as incomes  rise, ODA
first rises,  then falls. In Southeast  Asian countries with low income, net ODA
disbursement increases  as income increas~s  but only up to a certain point,
that is, when GDP per capita is below US$3,OOO.  For Southeast  Asian coun-
tries with  GDP per capita of US$6,OOO  and more, net ODA disbursement
decreases  as  income  improves.  However, the terms of official loans  for middle-
income countries are less concessional.
tAll financing that flows from developed country governments  and multilateral agencies  to the
developing world is called official  development  finance  (World Bank  1998).
2  Studies  such as those of the World Bank  have shown that tied aid reduces  the value of that
assistance  by about  25  percent.  Thus  untying bilateral  aid would make it more effective.
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Figure  A2.  As  incomes  risP,OLJA  first !ises,  then  falls.
Cambodia  Vietnam  Thailand  Malaysia
.GDP  per capita (PPP US$). 1999  CODA  net disbursements (US$ millions). 1999
Source:  Human  Development  Report  2001.
Spending  patterns. In 2001,  the World Bank reported that concessional
aid flows had maintained an upward  movement since 1998  and exhibited
further increase  in 2000.
This level of support, however, is haunted by the dwindling  amount of
global aid. As such,  several  donors are making adjustments  on which country
and on what activities  to fund. For instance,  the World Bank  is already  making
modifications  to remove its bias for infrastructure  projects  (World Bank 2001a).
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Aid spending is also  shifting to social  and human development  concerns.
The core and complementary  aid allocated to health (including complemen-
tary expenditures to improve water, sanitation, and waste management)  has
grown the fastest.  Donor spending  on family planning and reproductive health
has also increased. Another good news is that allocation on environment,
boosted mainly  by stronger support for biodiversity  preservation and for
upgrading  environmental administration,  has also grown rapidly  through
country-based aid (World  Bank  2001a).
Expenditure for reconstruction  and post-conflict peacebuilding grew in
the late 1990s  in consonance  with the regional promotion of peace.  Spending
for peacebuilding peaked in 1999,  displacing part of concessional  assistance
to health. However, the outlay on knowledge generation  and diffusion has
been sluggish, with  complementary spending on educational facilities and
training  severely curtailed.
In  recent years, development assistance  also shifted from financing in-
vestment  to promoting policy reforms. This reorientation  arose  from a grow-
ing awareness  that developing countries  were hamstrung  more by poor gov-
ernance  than by a lack of finance to invest in roads or dams.3
Aid  and growth.  Did  aid matter in promoting  growth and reducing
poverty in low-income countries?  Despite  the vast amount  of resources  poured
by donors to address human deprivation, poverty persists  as a global prob-
lem, casting doubt on the effectiveness  of aid.
Theoretically, aid can help reduce poverty. There is evidence  that 1 per-
cent of GDP in development assistance  translates to a 1 percent decline in
poverty and a similar decline in infant mortality. Some  cross-country  studies
made by the World  Bank have found  that with  sound economic manage-
ment, 1 percent of GDP in development assistance  translates  to a sustained
growth of 0.5 percentage  points of GDP (World Bank 1998).
Indonesia  in the 1970s,  Malaysia and Thailand in the late 1980s,  and Viet-
nam in the 1990s  are examples of countries that experienced  rapid develop-
ment under a so-called "sound"  economic management.  While foreign aid
might have played a role in the transformation of these  economies,  it is diffi-
cult to make a direct attribution on the effects  of aid on the growth of these
countries. Besides,  Indonesia's and Thailand's growth was significantly re-
versed in the 1997  with the onset of the Asian financial crisis.
Generally, the contention is that more aid is associated  with  more in-
vestment. But what aid often does is to encourage  domestic investment. A
.
3Jn  their studies of aid and growth, Burnside  and Dollar (1997)  find that development  efforts of
poor countries have been  held back,  not by a financing gap but by an "institutional gap" and a
"policy gap."
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large part of domestic investment, however, comes  from government. Using
panel regressions for 56 developing countries, Burnside and Dollar  (1997)
have found out that bilateral aid has strong positive impact on government
consumption.  This is consistent  with the widely held view that aid is fungible
and tends to increase  government spending proportionately, not just in the
sectors that donors think they are financing. However, the results also sug-
gest that increased government spending has no positive effect on growth.
Contrary to expectations,  aid does not necessarily  facilitate foreign in-
vestment, as Figure A3 suggests.  Since  aid is directed to poor countries, it is
not surprising  that higher levels of aid are not associated  with  increased
access  to international flows of private capital. In the figure, it is evident that
the more stable and robust economies  (Malaysia,  Philippines, and Thailand)
are getting more private flows. The low-income countries (e.g., Cambodia
and Laos), characterized by weaker economies  and maybe weaker institu-
tional environments, remain unattractive to foreign investors.
Nonetheless,  effective aid can work positively with private investment.
In this case,  official flows can be used to facilitate more private flows. Studies
by the World  Bank claim that aid "crowds in" private investment  by a ratio
of almost 2 to 1 (i.e., every 1 percent of GDP in aid brings in another 1.9
percent of GDP in private investment in well-managed and reform-oriented
countries). Under a good policy environment, it is said that aid increases  the
confidence of the private sector. In an unstable environment, however, aid
tends to "crowd  out" private investment.
Although aid can stimulate investment,  studies  revealed  that there is no
direct link between aid and growth  through enhanced factor productivity
(World Bank 2001a).  It seems  foreign capital only affects  productivity in coun-
tries with  superior human capital and developed financial structures. Since
the poor countries are weak in both, aid does not work  that way. Appar-
ently, the only instance  when aid enhances  productivity  in poor countries is
when it is used directly to increase  efficiency  in government  and its agencies.
Aid  and governance.  Donors generally aspire to direct their aid to coun-
tries with  good governance structures.4 For instance, development assis-
tance to Myanmar had declined due to its so-called "distorted'!  environ-
ment. Vietnam, with  its relatively good policy environment because  of doi
moi,  is a beneficiary  in the process.  Yet aid does not necessarily  reward good
4  While there arereconunendations  that aid be allocated on the basis of poverty and economic
management,  actual allocation has often been influenced by the strategic interests  of donors.
Accordingly, total bilateral aid has favored former colonies  and political allies more than open
economies  or democracies.  But  the trend is changing  (World Bank  1998).
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Figure  A4.  ODA and  good  governance:  negatively  related?
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policies  or even good  governance. Since the  philosophy  of aid  is humanitar-
ian,  good  governance  is  not  a requisite  in the  decision  of donors  on which
country  to assist.
Figure  A4 shows net ODA  disbursements as a percentage of GDP versus
the quality  of governance index,  constructed  by Huther  and  Shah (1998). It is
noted  that  ODA  disbursements  of  countries  with  better  governance  rating,
as in  the  case of the  Southeast  Asia  5, are lower.  Aid  generally  goes to
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countries  where  the  economy  is  very  weak  and  where  poverty  is worst-
characteristic  of poor  governance-with  the hope  that  it  can  help  improve
the  quality  of public  management in  the process.
Nevertheless,  there  is a strong  argument  for  making  good  policy  envi-
ronment  a key consideration in giving  development assistance,  since increased
aid  levels  seldom  stimulate  improvements  in policies  and  institutions.  The
success or failure  of public  investment  projects (especially those financed  by
donors)  depends  on  the  quality  of governance  of  recipient  countries.  Ac-
cording  to studies,  financial  aid  to  poor countries  with  good  policy  environ-
ments have high rates of success.s  The findings  also highlight  the fact that the
most critical  contribution  of donor-assisted  projects is not in increasing  fund-
ing  but  in  strengthening  institutions.
In  principle,  aid could  foster growth  and reduce poverty  by  influencing
domestic  policies  and  institutions.  Specifically,  aid  can be used by  recipient
governments  to  implement  difficult  reform  measures that  entail  short-term
costs but  have  long-term  payoffs.  But studies  show  that economic  policies
and  governance structures  rarely  respond  to increases in aid  flows.  In  some
countries,  increased  aid  had  encouraged  greater dependence  on donors  or
even  predatory  behavior,  with  adverse  effects  on  policy  and  governance
(World  Bank  2001a).  1
A.2 Aid  Management
1ne persistence  of poverty and seeming dependence  of some countries
on development  aid elevate concerns  about the efficiency  by which develop-
ment assistance  is being managed. Dependency on aid is evident in  many
countries in Southeast  Asia.6  For some, ODA is a significant source of gov-
ernment revenues. This type of financing, however, carries the burden of
debt repayment.  The situation is not bad for some Southeast  Asian countries
whose economies  can manage  debt servicing.  The others,  however, have lim-
ited capacity  to pay (Figure AS).  Sigliificant decrease  in ODA disbursement
and debt servicing can be observed of Malaysia and the Philippines. In the
5  An analysis of the success  and failure  of public  investment  projects financed  by the World  Bank in
roads, power, and education revealed that in countries with good macroeconomic environment  and
efficient public  institutions,  projects were 86 percent successful, with much higher rates of return.  In
countries  with  weak  policies  and  institutions,  the corresponding  figure  is it  measly 48 percent
(World  Bank 1998).
6  For instance, Cambodia had to rely heavily  on aid for financing basic goods and services, owing  to
its poor domestic  revenue mobilization  and questionable expenditure  allocation decisions. Donors
financed  about 60 percent  of public  expenditure  in  1997,  including  53 percent of expenditure  on
social sectors and 83 percent of expenditure  on economic services,  including  rural  development and
infrastructure.  Aid  now constitutes  9 percent of its GDP (World  Bank 2000a).
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transition economies,  except  Lao, PDR, are also marked by increased ODA
disbursements  and corresponding increase  in  debt servicing.
To service their debts, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines had to
allocate a substantial portion  of their income for loan repayment. Those of
Malaysia and Vietnam seem  manageable  at about 5 to 6 percent  of GNP (Fig-
ure A6). Laos and Cambodia seem to get more concessional  aid and good
repayment terms for loans. Since ODA loans are foreign currency- denomi-
nated, repayment  would have to be sourced mainly from the export earnings
of these countries.7  Of the countries where data are available,  Indonesia had
to use the biggest proportion of foreign exchange  earnings for debt payment
(30.3 percent of exports of goods and services).  Malaysia manages  well its
debt servicing at less than 5 percent of exports.
While the transition economies  in Southeast  Asia seem  to be getting fa-
vorable  ODA  terms  with  lower  annual repayments, a different  picture
emerges  in Figure A7.  Here, the debt burden of transition economies,  in-
cluding Indonesia is quite high when the present value of debt service is
taken into account.  Indeed, the more indebted countries  are those  with weaker
7  A related  issue  on repayment  is the  weakening  of the  domestic  currency of recipient  countries.  For
instance,  in the  case  of the Philippines,  a depreciation  of one  peso  against  the US  dollar results  in an
increase  in interest  payments  on  foreign debt  by PhPl.15  billion annually  (Philippine  Daily Inquirer,
16  July 2001). A similar case  would not be surprising in other Southeast  Asian countries.
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economic  management  (Table AI).  The World  BaI1lk  indebtedness classifica-
tion8 confirms  the  bigger  liabilities  of the lower-inqome  economies in  South-
east Asia. Those severely indebted  are Indonesia,9 Laos, and Myanmar.  Viet-
nam and  Cambodia  are moderately  indebted.  Malaysia,  the Philippines  and
Thailand,  which  are middle-income,  are better off,
How  is  aid  managed  to  spur  development  in  poor  countries  and  not
pose the  burden  of  debt service?
Fungibility  of aid. A key issue in managing aid is fungibility.  Devel-
opment aid is  often fungible,  which  means that a government can use
increased resources as it chooses. On a positive  note, fungibility  allows
8  The  World Bank  classifies  indebtedness  based  on  two ratios:  the  ratio of the present  value of total
debt  service  to GNP  and the  ratio of the present  value of total debt  service  to exports.  These  ratios
indicate potential capacity  to service  debts  in terms of (a)  export$,  because  they  are  the source  of
foreign  exchange;  and (b)  GNP,  the  broadest  measure  of  income  g~eration in an  economy.  If either
ratio exceeds  a critical value (i.e.,  80 percent  for debt  service  to GNP ratio, or 220  percent  for debt
service to exports ratio), a country is considered severely  indebted. If the critical value is not
exceeded  but either  ratio is 3/5 or more of the critical value,  i.e.,  48  percent  for the present  value of
debt  service  to GNP  and 132  percent  for the present  value of debt \)ervice  to exports,  the country is
classified  as  moderately  indebted. If both ratios are  less  than 3/5 of the critical value,  a country is
classified  as  less  indebted. (World Bank  2001a).
9  The Asian crisis left Indonesia deeply in debt. The World Bank estimates  that after Indonesia
completes the task of bank recapitalization, government debt will  add up to a towering 100
percent  of GDP,  up from 23  percent  of GDP  before  the crisis. Debt  service  will take up more than
four-fifths of government  revenues,  along with politically sensiUve  fuel subsidies  and the  wage
bill, putting unbearable  pressure  on the  budget  and  threatening  to crowd out development  spend- ing (World Bank  2001).  '
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Note: PV/XGS is the  present value of  debt service to exports of goods and services.  PV/GNP is the  present
value  of debt  service  to GNP.
.Indebtedness  classification  has improved
Source: World Bank 2001a.
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flexibility  and  provides  more  elbow  room  to  recipient  governments  in
the  allocation  of  resources.  Yet  it  makes  monitoring  difficult.
Fungibility  can  overshadow  the value  of aid  from  the  donor  point  of
view  and  diminish  its  effects  on investments.  For  instance,  an  aid  dollar
used to finance  projects  in  education  tends  to increase  government  spend-
ing  in  all  sectors  to  the  same  extent  as a dollar  of  government  revenue
form  any  source  (World  Bank  1998). Sectoral  fungibility  is  another  issue.
For  instance,  aid  for  education  can lead  to  a reduction  in  what  the  gov-
ernment  would  otherwise  have  spent  on  school  programs.  Conversely  /
aid  for  other  sectors  can cause the  government  to  spend  more  on  educa-
tion.
Based on  these findings,  it  would  seem that  development  aid  simply
expands  the  government's  budget.  On  the  bright  side,  Devarajan  and
Swaroop  (1998) note  that  even  if  local  spending  is diverted,  aid  may  still
have  an  added  value,  since  it  comes  with  technical  assistance  and  the
expert  management  skills  of  donor  agencies.  This  in  turn  may  increase
the project's  rate  of  return  and  lead  to changes in policy,  institutions,  and
project  design.
Coordination  of aid.  Another  issue in  aid  management is donor  compe-
tition.  The proliferation  of donors  and  lack of coordination  among them con-
tribute  to  the  inefficient  use of limited  global  aid  resources and  exacerbate
the  adverse effects  of aid  allocation  based on donor  interests 1°. Some well-
managed countries  (e.g., Malaysia)  are able to force  coordination  on donors.
But in weaker countries,  donors  can have their  own  way  of choosing projects
to  promote  their  own  strategic  interests.
Donor  preference  for  tangible  and  high-visibility  projects  (e.g., infra-
structure)  is  not  uncommon,  since donors  have to  justify  their  spending  to
their  taxpayers.  Donor-driven  projects,  however,  often  suffer  from
sustainability  problems.  Many  infrastructure  projects  turn  out  to be white
elephants due to  lack of capacity  or diminished  interest of recipients to main-
tain  them.  Moreover,  the  piecemeal  approach  in  project  execution limits  the
potential  of  development  aid  to  effect  significant  transformations  in  low-
income countries.  Poor coordination  also leads to  "crowding  in"  of donors in
built-up  and  more  accessible  areas,  leaving  out  other  poorer  regions  and
localities  that need assistance most.
10  The traditional approach  to aid management  has  also  reduced  the participation of local  commu-
nities  in the  design  and implementation  of development  projects.  More so,  donor responses  to weak
institutions have  been  ineffective.  Faced  with low absorptive  capacity  and pressures  to "move the
money," many  aid agencies  "cocoon" their projects  rather than  improve the institutional environ-
ment for service  provision (World Bank  1998).
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Cambodia is a case  in point. The multiple activities of donors place an
unsustainable  management  burden on the government  and its limited insti-
tutional capacity. Each donor has a different administrative procedure for
procurement and disbursement in Cambodia. Without coordination, large
amounts  of technical  assistance  are unable to build real institutional capacity.
The Cambodian government claims to have insufficient ownership of many
projects  and programs, and large amounts  0~9DA  flow outside the govern-
ment budgetary system.  The lack of accountability  on projects  and programs,
including evaluations  and audits of the impact of projects,  is also a problem
(World Bank 2000a).
A.3 Making  Aid  Better Managed and More Effective
Aid  must be effectively managed to make sure that it can stimulate  growth
and  strengthen  the  institutions  of recipient  countries.  Donors  can make  aid
work  more  effectively  in  recipient  countries  through  partnership  rather  than
through  competition.  They can also enhance the value  of aid  by increasingly
providing  ideas not just  goods, untying  aid  and  allowing  recipients  to take
"ownership'!  of and  greater  flexibility  in the use of aid.
Partnering and having a common basket.  Donors should bear in mind
that the more successful  development  assistance  packages  are those  focusing
on larger transformations,  not on individual projects.  This fact calls for strong
partnership among donors. A  "common pool"  approach to assistance  for
each  country can create greater impact and ease  aid management.
To be effective, donors must also be willing  to observe  the principle of
subsidiarity-or  allowing the most knowledgeable  organization in any given
initiative  to take the lead. It is by operating in a decentralized, network-
based  system  of governance  that donors  will influence  political decisionmaking
to advance national and regional interests (World Bank 2001a).
The donors' "common basket" must increasingly provide more for hu-
man development, especially  basic education  and health. The Sachs  commis-
sion argues  that there  would be large collateral  benefits  from improved health
care in the world's poorest  nations. Disease,  it argues,  is a major obstacle  to
economic growth,  which  in turn would  make the developing countries a
richer and safer  place to be (Krugman 2001).  Investments  in these  basic ser-
vices have large externalities that even developed  countries  can benefit from.
Accordingly,  the price  tag of a program to provide  very basic items that
many poor nations simply cannot  afford (such  as antibiotics to treat tubercu-
losis, insecticide-treated  nets to control !Ilalaria) would be about  0.1 percent
of advanced countries' income. The payoff would  be at least eight million
lives saved each  year (Krugman 2001).
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Enhancing flexibility  of aid.  Without  discounting  the difficulties  in moni-
toring,  donors  ought  to  consider  shifting  development  aid  from  project  to
budget  support  to give  recipient  countries  more  flexibility  in  allocating  such
resources  in  the  context  of  their  long-term  sustainable  development  goals
(Lamberte  2002).
Fungibility  of aid  is  not  a bad idea,  especially  if  recipient  governments
have  efficient  public  expenditure  management.  Some developing  countries
believe  that  they  "own"  the aDA,  especially  loans  which  they  will  have to
repay  anyway  in  the future.
Therefore,  they,  not  the  donors,  must  have  control  over the  disburse-
ment  of these resources.  But  in  cases where  public  sector  management  is
weak  and  where  inefficiencies  in  allocation  exist,  fungible  aid  may  not be
used productively.  Nevertheless, donors  must be on the lookout  for the over-
all  quality  of public  spending  by  recipient  countries  in  choosing the  level of
financial  support  and the type  of assistance to provide.
Similarly,  donors  may need to  simplify  operational  policies  and proce-
dures  and remove  burdensome  restrictions  such as aid tying.  They must al-
low  recipient  countries  to choose the  best inputs  they  see fit  for  their  pro-
grams and projects  (Lamberte  2002).
Ideas aid vs. money aid. Aid  can support effective public  institutions
and good governance  by helping with experimentation  on service  provision,
dissemination of development ideas, and stimulating  policy discussion. In
governance areas where there is demand for reform,  aid can make a big
contribution by supporting pilot projects.  Thus, donors can leverage  through
"idea aid" by supporting institutional and policy reforms  (World Bank  2001a).
Right timing. Timing of aid is also critical. If donors were good at antici-
pating "turning points:'  they could deploy aid just before reforms  are started.
In such case,  an increase  in aid flowing to "poor policy regimes" would be
followed by reforms. For instance,  while it is fair to characterize  Myanmar as
"poorly  managed," chances are there are reform-minded  elements in the
government. Aid  can make a big difference if donors can find  and support
these reformers (World  Bank 1998).
Increasing absorptive capacity for aid. Additionally,  a supportive envi-
ronment that enables  countries  to absorb  and use  aid effectively  is also  needed.
Where there is limited  absorptive capacity, aid management  can also be fa-
cilitated by actively involving  nongovernment organizations. NGOs can be
used as implementing agencies  for donor-financed projects. In many cases,
NGOs reach local and target groups more effectively than can a typical gov-
ernment agency.  While NGOs can be an alternative delivery structure, they
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cannot replace government and be a permanent substitute for public sector
capacity.
Leveraging aid  with  private  resources. Official  funds  can be deployed  to
mobilize  or "pull  in"  private  finance  for activities  that offer possibilities  for a
commercial  business  (e.g., developing  and  distributing  new drugs  and  vac-
cine, bridging  the  gap between rich  and poor in  information  technology,  and
increasing  agricultural  productivity)  (World  Bank 2001a). Aid  resources, by
"crowding  in"  private  funds,  actually  leverage  additional  money to  support
developmental  activities.
Regional integration  of  aid. Many environmental, natural resource  man-
agement,  and health issues are regional in nature. Without coordinated ef-
forts,  they lead to free riding.  Regional approaches can sp~wn efficiency;
regional harmonization of policy can help small countries such as Laos over-
come their size disadvantage,  which often discourages  investment. Differen-
tial pricing-lower  interest charges  for some investment  loans-could  be ap-
plied  to the financing  of activities with  regional or cross-country benefits
(World  Bank 2001a).
A.4  Japanese ODA
Is Japanese  ODA more effectively deployed to poverty reduction?
Japan  is the world's  largest donor (although its contribution  still falls
short of the annual equivalent of 0.7 percent  of GNP target for industrialized
countries). The Japanese  ODA has been characterized  by a smaller share of
grants and a much larger share of loans relative to the DAC average.  Of the
total Japanese  development assistance,  89 percent consists  of loans while 11
percent  comprises  grants. The reverse  applies to the United States,  with  de-
velopment assistance  consisting of 86 percent grants and 14 percent loans
(Tadem 2001).  Accordingly,  the high proportion  of loans in Japan's ODA
reflects  the country's aid philosophy of self-helpll and the government's  de-
sire to leverage ODA resources.  But this should not deter the Japanese  gov-
ernment to increase  the concessionality  of Japanese  ODA.
A large share of Japanese  ODA goes  to Asia, up to about 90 percent.  In
1999,  Japan  registered  the most significant  increase  in aid among  major  donors.
The increase  was intended for countries  affected  by the 1997  financial  crisis.  The
main beneficiary of this increase  was Indonesia,  although Thailand and Viet-
nam also experienced  a rise in aid inflows from the Japanese  government.
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Despite being the biggest contributor to global aid, Japanese  ODA is
being criticized for its overemphasis  on infrastructure-related  projects  (Table
A2) and for its "restrained willingness"  to participate in multilateral part-
nerships (Kawai and Takagi  2001).
The bulk  of Japanese  ODA, outside of commodity loans, goes to the
transportation sector, electric power and gas, mining and manufacturing
which are infrastructure  related.  Except for Malaysia, which was able to
draw a significant amount of development  loan for social  services,  the social
application of Japanese  ODA is significantly small for the rest of Southeast
Asia.
There are also contentions that Japanese  ODA is tied to purchases of
goods or services from Japanese  firms although, according to Kawai and
Takegi (2001),  the share of contracts given to Japanese  outfits in ODA loan
projects  had already significantly declined from nearly 70 percent  in the 1980s
to 24 percent  in 2000.12  For instance,  Japan  is said to earn 75 cents  to 95 cents
for every dollar of aid it gives in the form of goods and services  purchased
by the recipient countries (Tadem  2001).  A study of Tsuda and Yokoyama
12  Internally, the Japanese  government  is faced with public perception that ODA does  serve  the
economic  interests of Japan  (Kawai and Takegi 2001).
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(1986)  also revealed that 90 percent of Japanese  commodity loans were used
to purchase  Japanese  goods.
Likewise,  there are instances  when Japanese  aid has  also been  tied to con-
ditionalities.  Examples  include the Asian Development  Bank  loan and the use  of
the Miyazawa Fund for the power sector  restructuring  plan in the Philippines
which was conditioned on the passage  of a controversial  Omnibus Power Bill
(Tadem 2001).
Japan's  ODA system  is required to make major  changes  in order to switch
from a framework of lending support to a single project by a single entity
such  as  a government,  especially  a central government,  to a system  and frame-
work that can provide detailed support to various activities by many differ-
ent entities (Kidokoro, 2000).  Accordingly, the conventional  ODA framework
based on the notion of government institutions providing services  to recipi-
ents  needs  to be changed.  Ownership by recipients  and flexibility in choosing
the improvement measures  are important key factors in enhancing  the effec-
tiveness of Japanese  aid.
To improve the effectiveness  and quality of Japanese  ODA, Kawai and
Takagi (2001)  have put forward several  proposals.  Firstly, there is a need for
Japanese  aid agencies  to adopt a strategic approach to assisting economic
development and poverty reduction in low-income countries, in greater  co-
ordination  with  other stakeholders in the international development com-
munity,  instead of independently  undertaking projects. In designing and
implementing development  projects,  Japanese  aid agencies  must work closely
with  the community  particularly  nongovernment organizations and other
civil society elements.
Japanese  aid must likewise  explicitly  focus on poverty reduction and
human development. Japan's development assistance  can also extend its
concessional  window to middle income countries in Southeast  Asia to accel-
erate antipoverty programs.
Japanese  aid agencies  should continue to untie aid and allow recipient
governments  to decide the inputs that best fit  their programs and projects.
Japan  can also do well in providing "ideas aid" based on the Japanese  expe-
rience.  Japanese  ODA can also have higher leverage  if side by side with hard
infrastructure projects, part of the aid will  be used on institution  building
and economic reform.
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